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ABSTRACT
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MEGHAN B. MASTO, B.A., B.S., LAFAYETTE COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Hilary Komblith
In this dissertation I attempt to develop a better understanding of knowledge and
belief. In Chapter 1 I offer an analysis of knowledge-vv/?. I argue that knowledge-wh
ascriptions express that a subject stands in the knowledge relation to a question— where
to stand in this knowledge relation to a question is to know an answer to the question.
Additionally I adopt a contextualist picture of knowledge-vr/z. I raise some problems for
invariantism about knowledge-vr/z and I argue that contextual ism about knowledge-w/z
fits nicely with a very natural understanding of the semantics of interrogatives, and the
nature of questions.
In Chapter 2 consider whether knowledge-/zme is importantly different from
knowledge-vv/z. I argue that ‘knows how’ is ambiguous, but on one sense knowledge-//ovv
ascriptions should be treated just like the other knowledge ascriptions with interrogative
complements. Hence this type of knowledge-/zovv is not fundamentally distinct from
knowledge-wh.
In Chapter 3 I reconsider various theories about knowledge and knowledge-f/zczf
ascriptions in light of our conclusions about knowledge-vr/z ascriptions. It seems that
doing so can help adjudicate between contextualism and invariantism about knowledge-
v
that and may help determine which form of contextualism about knowledge-///*:// is the
most plausible.
In Chapter 4 I consider whether there is some fact about the nature of the attitudes
that determines the verb’s complement selection. Some have suggested that the
embedding behavior of attitude verbs is correlated with the factivity of the attitude verb. I
evaluate this suggestion and the possible explanations for the embedding behavior of the
various attitude verbs. I attempt to determine the extent to which the factivity of verbs is
correlated with their embedding behavior and I attempt to explain why factivity plays
such an important role. I argue that these facts can provide important insights into the
nature of the attitudes.
In Chapter 5 I explore the way in which knowledge and action are related in an
important way. I consider the claim that it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as
a reason for action if and only if you know that p. I first present and explain the principle.
Next I consider some objections to the proposal, and I argue that none of these objections
is successful. I claim that the contrastivist, in particular, has several moves available in
the face of the alleged problems with this Reason-Knowledge principle.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT v
CHAPTER
1
.
QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND KNOWLEDGE- W// 1
The Move to Anti-Reductionism 2
Understanding the Question 17
Conclusion 32
2. KNOWING HOW AND KNOWING HOW 33
Stanley and Williamson on Ryle 34
Stanley and Williamson on Knowledge-/?ovv 41
A New Understanding of Knowledge-/?ovv 47
Conclusion 52
3. EVIDENCE FOR CONTRASTIVISM 54
Williamson on Evidence 59
K=E and Epistemic Contrastivism 63
Pritchard on Contrastivism. Evidence, and Skepticism 66
Pritchard on Assertion and Claims to Know 73
Conclusion 80
4. QUESTIONS AND THE COMPLEMENT-EMBEDDING BEHAVIOR OF THE
ATTITUDE VERBS 82
Egre on Factivity, Veridicality, and Complements 84
Egre on the Meaning of Whether and Complement-embedding Behavior 85
Problems for Egre 92
An Alternative Understanding of the Meaning of Whether-c\aus&s 95
Whether-clauses and Complement-embedding Behavior 97
Conclusion 103
vii
5. ON KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 106
Hawthorne and Stanley on the Reason-Knowledge Principle 106
Reconsidering the Opponent 108
Is Knowledge Necessary for Action? 1 12
Littlejohn on the Reason-Knowledge Principle 1 13
Is Knowledge Sufficient for Action? 120
Contrastivism and the Reason-Knowledge Principle 121
Conclusion 127
BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
viii
CHAPTER 1
QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND KNOWLEDGE -WH
Most of the philosophical literature on knowledge and knowledge ascriptions has
been focused on knowledge-that, with philosophers wondering what conditions are
necessary and sufficient for knowing that p and what proposition is expressed when we
say of someone that the she knows that p. This emphasis on knowledge is both surprising
and disappointing— surprising given that knowledge-r/jr/f ascriptions seem relatively
uncommon in ordinary conversation and disappointing because it seems that such a focus
on knowledge-r/wr has distracted from other questions that may allow us more insight
into the nature of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions. Recently some philosophers and
linguists have turned their attention to knowledge-w/z and knowledge-w/? ascriptions—
that is, knowledge ascriptions with an interrogative complement rather than a declarative
complement. In this chapter I, too, set out to better understand knowledge-vv/? and
ultimately argue that a proper understanding of knowledge-w// ascriptions can provide us
insight into knowledge-that ascriptions and the nature of knowledge itself.
So what does it take for me to know where you can buy an Italian newspaper?
According to the reductionist, I know where you can buy an Italian newspaper just in
case there is some proposition,/?, that I know and that happens to be an answer to the
question you express when you utter the following interrogative sentence,
(1) Where can I buy an Italian newspaper?
In this way knowledge-vv7z reduces to knowledge-that: all knowledge is simply a relation
between a knower and a proposition. That is, a knowledge attribution of the form, l s
knows-wh’ is true, according to the reductionist, if and only if there is some proposition,
1
p , such that p answers the question in the wh-clause of the knowledge-vv/; attribution and
s knows that p.
The anti-reductionist claims that this is not enough. According to the anti-
reductionist, I know where you can buy an Italian newspaper just in case there is some
proposition,/?, that answers the question you express in uttering (1) and, further, that I
know p as the answer to the question. Note that knowledge-vv/; does not reduce to
knowledge-r/;c;r if anti-reductionism is true— it is not the case that all knowledge is
simply a relation between a knower and a proposition, rather the knower must also stand
in some relation to a question.
2
The Move to Anti-Reductionism
There are several reasons to favor anti-reductionism. To start it seems that there
are occasions in which we do know some proposition, but we do not know it as the
answer to a particular question, and hence a knowledge vv/;-ascription would seem false.3
To illustrate, suppose that Amy knows that Bob was late every day last week. Suppose
also that Bob was fired for being late every day last week but that Amy does not know
that this is the reason for Bob’s firing. Now consider the following knowledge-vv/;
attribution:
(2) Amy knows why Bob was fired.
1
See Hintikka (1975), Lewis (1982), Boer and Lycan ( 1986), and Higginbotham ( 1996)
for a defense of reductionism.
See Schaffer (2007) for a defense of anti-reductionism.
3
Brogaard (forthcoming) mentions examples similar to those found below.
(2)
is false even though there is a proposition that Amy knows and that answers the
indirect question in the w/z-clause.
Or consider a question that requires an exhaustive list in order to be answered
correctly. Suppose, for example that Carl knows that Dana and Eli passed the exam but
that he does not know how the other students performed. As it turns out, unbeknownst to
Carl, Dana and Eli are the only students who passed the exam. Now consider the
following knowledge attribution,
(3) Carl knows which students passed the exam.
It seems, again that (3) is false even though there is some proposition that Carl knows
that does answer the indirect question in the w/z-clause.
Anti-reductionist Jonathan Schaffer (2007) argues that there are cases in which
we may know the answer to one question while failing to know the answer to another
question that has the very same true answer. To illustrate, suppose that there is a
goldfinch in the garden. It seems that (4) may be true while (5) is false:
(4) Fran knows whether there is a goldfinch or a raven in the garden.
(5) Fran knows whether there is a goldfinch or a canary in the garden.
But if the reductionist is correct, then it is impossible for (4) to be true and (5) false given
that the indirect questions in the vv/z-clauses have the same true answer. For on the
reductionist picture, whenever two questions have the same unique true answer,
embedding the questions into knowledge-w/z attributions makes it the case that the
knowledge attributions must have the same truth-value.
These reasons, then, suggest that which indirect question is in the wh-clause of a
knowledge-w/z attribution is relevant to the truth-conditions of that attribution. Hence the
3
anti-reductionist claims that S knows-w/z only if there is some true proposition,/?, that
answers the indirect question, and s knows p as the answer to the indirect question.
Schaffer takes this a step further and argues that claims like (4) and (5) express different
propositions— /G/?()^ and KspQs respectively. Notice that on Schaffer’s view,
propositions expressed by the knowledge-vc/z attributions contain both the true answer to
the indirect question and the question itself. So on Schaffer’s view, utterances of (4) and
(5) expresses the following propositions respectively,
(4p) Fran knows that there is a goldfinch in the garden rather than a raven.
(5p) Fran knows that there is a goldfinch in the garden rather than a canary.
4
Of course, (4p) may be true while (5p) is false.
However, as Berit Brogaard (forthcoming) and Kent Bach (2005) point out, it
seems that it is a mistake to think that knowledge-vv/z ascriptions express propositions that
include the proposition that answers the indirect question. For we can utter true
knowledge-vv/z ascriptions for which we ourselves do not know the answer to the indirect
question, so it would seem strange for the answer to the question to be part of the
proposition expressed in making the ascription. For example, suppose the car is parked
on Main, but that Greg does not know this. Now suppose Greg utters the following
sentence,
(6) Holly knows where the car is parked.
4
Schaffer claims that (4p) and (5p) respectively are equivalent to the following:
(4p') Fran knows that there is a goldfinch in the garden as the answer to the question of
whether there is a goldfinch or raven in the garden.
(5p’) Fran knows that there is a goldfinch in the garden as the answer to the question of
whether there is a goldfinch or canary in the garden.
4
In uttering (6) it seems that Greg cannot thereby express that Holly knows that the car is
parked on Main (rather than Elm). For Greg does not know where the car is parked!
Additionally, it seems that Greg would be expressing something different if he were to
utter (6) instead of (6’):
(6’) Holly knows that the car is parked on Main.
In uttering (6) Greg tells us that Holly knows the answer to a particular question; while in
uttering (6’) Greg tells us what the answer to the question is. But if Schaffer is right, then
(6) and (6’) actually express the very same proposition. So the anti-reductionist seems
right to point out that the answer to the indirect question and the question itself determine
the truth conditions of knowledge-vv/z attributions, but we should not go so far as to claim
that the answer and the question are constituents of the proposition expressed by an
utterance of the attribution.'’
5
Note that Schaffer (2007, fn. 20) includes a footnote in which he argues that there seems
to be linguistic evidence that supports the inclusion of the proposition that is the answer
in the logical form of the proposition expressed. First he points to the validity of
existential generalization on the answer; from ( 1) S knows -vv/z, we can conclude that (2)
There is an answer that s knows to the question of vv/z. So if I know where the car is
parked, then we can conclude that there is an answer that I know to the question of where
the car is parked. Next, Schaffer points to the validity of substitution for the answer.
From ( 1) S knows -vv/z and (2) The answer to w/z is an ADJ answer, we can conclude (3) S
knows the ADJ answer to the question of u7z. For example, if I know where the car is
parked and the answer to the question of where the car is parked is an unfortunate
answer, then I know the unfortunate answer to the question of where the car is parked.
Finally Schaffer points out that we seem to be able to anaphorically refer to the answer.
For instance, “I know where the car is parked. 1 learned it from Tom.” Here, “it” seems to
be referring to the proposition that answers the question of where the car is parked. Yet
the proposed view can handle this data equally well. On the current proposal, knowledge-
u7z is a relation between a person and a question and there must be an answer known in
order for the knower to stand in the knowledge-vv/z relation to the question. Yet the
answer to the question does not need to be contained in the proposition expressed by the
knowledge attribution in order for existential generalization on and substitution for the
answer to be valid. To see this, note that we also existentially generalize on, substitute
for, and anaphorically refer to what is eaten in an eating attribution, even though the
5
What proposition is expressed when we utter a knowledge-w/? attribution?
Brogaard (forthcoming, 14) suggests that Schaffer might revise his view in light of the
problem just mentioned. She recommends that an anti-reductionist claim that utterances
of the form ‘s knows -xvh' express propositions of the form ‘there is a proposition,/?, such
that s knows that p as the answer to Q.' On the proposed view, an utterance of
(7) Ian knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper
then, expresses the following proposition,
(7p) There is some proposition,/?, such that Ian knows p as the answer to the
question of where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
If the anti-reductionist were to accept this view, he is no longer committed to the idea that
an utterance of a knowledge-w7? ascription expresses the proposition that is the answer to
the indirect question— instead, each knowledge-vW/ attribution claims that there is some
answer such that the knower recognizes it as the answer to the question.
Insofar as this proposed view is an attempt to ascertain the proposition expressed
by knowledge-u7/ ascriptions, I think it still gets things wrong in making too much of the
proposition that is the answer to the indirect question. While the anti-reductionist is right
in recognizing that knowledge of the proposition that is the answer to the indirect
question is necessary for the knowledge-wA ascription to be true, it is not clear why we
attribution need not refer to the thing eaten and the proposition expressed need not refer
to or contain the thing eaten. So, from (1)1 ate, we can conclude that (2) There is
something that I ate. And from ( 1 ) I ate, and (2) The thing I ate was a delicious treat, we
can conclude that (3) I ate a delicious treat. Finally, in “I ate. I thought it was really
tasty.” The “it” seems to refer to the thing eaten. We see then, that the evidence Schaffer
points to is certainly not an infallible guide to the constituents of the proposition
expressed on any occasion. While the evidence seems to indicate that there must be an
answer to the question, it does not suggest that the answer is included in the logical form
of the proposition expressed.
6
should think that the knowledge-vr/? ascription references the answer or even quantifies
over propositions that may be the answer. In other words, it is true that there must be
some proposition known for a knowledge-vWz ascription to be true, but the knowledge-w/z
ascription need not express that there is a proposition that is known. After all, the surface
form of knowledge-w’/j ascriptions gives us no reason to think that such sentences express
quantified propositions or propositions containing the answer to the indirect question.
Further, in seems that, in general, we should not accept that the truth conditions of a
sentence will accurately reflect the logical form of the sentence. Consider, for example,
the sentence mentioned in footnote 5: “I ate.” In order for this sentence to be true, it must
be the case that there is something that Bob ate. Nevertheless, it seems that the logical
form of this sentence is Ab
,
rather than, Bx(Abx) or (supposing Bob ate spaghetti) Abs .6
Additionally, it is interesting to note that knowledge-w// ascriptions and wonder-vt7/
ascriptions have parallel logical forms. I take this as a primafacie reason for thinking that
wonder-ascription sentences and knowledge-ascription sentences have the same logical
form. But certainly wonder-ascription sentences do not express that there is some
proposition that is wondered. So it seems that knowledge-w/? ascription sentences do not
express that there is some proposition that is known. I elaborate on this point below when
I discuss my proposed view about know ledge-wh.
Brogaard herself rejects the revised anti-reductionist theory but accepts a
somewhat similar view. Brogaard argues that w/z-complement clauses are predicates,
semantically akin to definite and indefinite noun phrase complement clauses like, ‘the
kind of bird in the garden’ or ‘a place that sells Italian newspapers.’ So on Brogaard's
6
cf. Bach (2005,3)
7
view, utterances of the form ‘s knows-wh-F' express propositions of the form, ‘for some
x, s knows that x is wh-F.' On this account, (7) expresses the following proposition:
(7p’) For some /, Ian knows that / is where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
On Brogaard's view then, knowledge-vv/z is a type of de re knowledge— knowledge of a
thing as a thing to which the w/z-predicate applies. To know where one can buy an Italian
newspaper is to know a place as a place where one can buy an Italian newspaper. To
know who is speaking is to know the person who is speaking as the person who is
speaking. To know why Bob was fired is to know some reason as the reason Bob was
fired. Because Brogaard holds that the w/z-clauses are predicates, knowledge-w/z
ascriptions do not actually include any indirect question on her view. But, as I explain
below, Brogaard's theory seems to go wrong for precisely this reason.
So I disagree with Schaffer that the proposition expressed when uttering a
knowledge attribution contains the proposition that is the answer to the indirect question.
I disagree with the modified anti-reductionist that the proposition expressed when
uttering a knowledge attribution is a quantified proposition and I disagree with Brogaard
that the proposition expressed when uttering a knowledge attribution does not contain a
question. Instead, I follow Bach (2005) in accepting that knowledge-w7z ascriptions
express a relation between a knower and a question. That is, the logical form of some
knowledge-vv/z ascription is not KspQ as Schaffer argues, but rather, KsQ. But, as Bach
notes, to stand in this knowledge relation to a question is not to know the question but
rather to know an answer to the question (as an answer to the question). On the preferred
view, then, to utter (7) is simply to claim that Ian stands in the knowledge relation to the
question of where one can buy an Italian newspaper. For Ian to stand in the knowledge
8
relation to this question is for Ian to know an answer to the question as an answer to the
question. Note that on this account, we still have the happy result that (4) and (5) express
different propositions— (4) expresses a relation between Fran and one question (Is there a
goldfinch or a raven in the garden?) and (5) expresses a relation between Fran and a
different question (Is there a goldfinch or a canary in the garden?). And we still have the
happy result that (4) and (5) may differ in truth-value. On this view, for (4) to be true,
Fran must not only know that there is a goldfinch in the garden, but must know it as an
answer to the indirect question in the vv/z-clause. And for (5) to be true, Fran must know
that there is a goldfinch as the answer to the question in that w/z-clause. So we see that,
even in a case in which the indirect questions have the same unique true answer, an agent
may correctly be said to know the answer to one of the questions without knowing the
answer to the other.
This theory has several additional advantages. First, the view allows for a unified
treatment of each of the attitudes whose verbs permit interrogative complements; neither
of the other proposed views does. Consider wonder-w/z ascriptions, for example. It seems
likely that a sentence of the form ‘s wonders-w/f expresses a relation between a person
and a question. What else could such a sentence express if not such a relation?
Additionally, it seems likely that the logical form of a wonder-vc/z ascription is WsQ. And
to stand in this wonder relation to a question is to wonder what the answer to the question
is. Further, at least on the surface, it appears that knowledge-vr/z ascriptions and wonder-
w/z ascriptions have a similar logical form. Consider the following wonder-w/z ascription:
(8) Ian wonders where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
9
It seems reasonable to think that (7) and (8) each express a relation holding between a
person, namely Ian, and a question, namely the one expressed by the interrogative
sentence, “Where can one buy an Italian newspaper?” (7) and (8) simply differ in the
kind of relation that is supposed to hold between this person and this question— in (7) it is
the relation of knowing the answer and in (8) it is the relation of wondering what the
answer is. Thus in claiming that knowledge-vv/z ascriptions do contain a question at the
level of logical form, do not contain the answer at the level of logical form, and do not
express quantified propositions, we allow a uniform treatment of wonder-vv/z and
knowledge-w/z.
Schaffer must posit an asymmetry between knowledge-n /z and wonder-wh
ascriptions. He claims that sentences of the form ‘s knows-wh' express propositions of
the form KspQ— to claim that s knows-wh is to claim that s knows p as the answer to Q.
Yet there is no analogous treatment of wonder-wh. We do not want to claim that
sentences of the form ‘s wonders-wh' express propositions of the form WspQ— for to
wonder-vv/z is clearly not to wonder p as the answer to Q (or even to wonder whether p is
the answer to Q). For example, in wondering where I can buy an Italian newspaper, it
seems that I do not thereby wonder of some particular proposition whether it answers the
question of where I can buy an Italian newspaper. And so in making a wonder-wh
ascription, one does not claim that the subject wonders whether a particular proposition
answers the question.
The revised anti-reductionist view faces a similar dilemma. Remember that on
this view to claim that s knows-vt’/z just is to claim that there is some proposition such that
s knows it as the answer to Q. But we would not want to say the same about wonderment-
10
wh. To wonder-w/i there need not be any proposition such that the agent wonders whether
it is the answer to the question. So we again lose the apparent similarity between wonder-
wh ascriptions and knowledge-vv// ascriptions. And it seems that Brogaard’s view faces
similar problems, for there seems to be no analysis of wonder-wh ascriptions that mirrors
her analysis of knowledge-ve/* ascriptions. Certainly we should not understand (8) as
expressing that Tor some /, John wonders whether / is where one can buy an Italian
newspaper.' When one wonders, it seems that that person must stand in a relation to a
question, but not to a proposition or to any thing. Thus, wonder ascriptions do not express
propositions that claim a subject does stand in any relation to a proposition or a thing.
Since wonder-w// ascriptions are so similar to know-wh ascriptions, it seems unlikely that
know-wh ascriptions express these sorts of propositions either.
The view suggested here seems better equipped to handle other data as well.
Schaffer (2007, 394) mentions, for example, that including the question in the
knowledge-vW; ascription fits the role of such knowledge ascriptions. For we typically use
knowledge-w/i ascriptions to indicate who has evidence, expertise and answers— but who
has evidence, expertise, and answers depends on the question under consideration.
Brogaard (forthcoming, 33) claims that her view can explain how knowledge-w/; fills this
role in virtue of the fact that each ve/?-clause is associated with a question. Yet, it seems
that a question-including view has a much more plausible explanation. So it seems that a
question-including view has an advantage over Brogaard's view in this respect. But it
seems that the evidence Schaffer points to better supports my view than his own.
Consider that we might utter (7) in the context of someone wondering where he can find
an Italian newspaper. We would do so to indicate that Ian knows the answer to his
11
question. In fact, on the current proposal an utterance of (7) would express the very
proposition that Ian knows the answer to the question of where one can find an Italian
newspaper and so would serve this role of knowledge-w7z attributions perfectly.
Further, the proposed view not only connects knowledge and inquiry in the way
that Schaffer argues they should be connected, but in treating wonderment-w/z and
knowledge-w/z analogously it also explains progress through inquiry. As Ludlow (2005),
Hintikka (1981), and others suggest, inquiry seems to be driven by a question-answer
process. That is, we pose an initial question, say Qi— and we wonder what the answer to
that question is. As we rule out possible answers to the question, we come closer and
closer to knowledge of the answer. Once we rule out each of the relevant false
alternatives, we know the answer to Q/. At that point we may pose another question and
repeat the process. So wonderment-w/z is a relation between a subject and a question, and
knowledge-w/z is a relation between a subject and a question. To wonder wh-Q is to
wonder what the answer to Q is. To know wh-Q is to know what the answer to Q is.
Successful inquiry is the process by which we move from wonderment-w/z to knowledge-
w/z. If we are forced to claim that knowledge-w/z and wonder-w/z are relations to different
entities, it seems like there is no natural explanation of progress through inquiry. These
reasons then offer evidence for a question-including view over a non-question including
view like Brogaard’s and for a parallel treatment of wonder-w/z ascriptions and
know ledge-w/z ascriptions.
Finally, this view allows us to expand the treatment to each of the “attitude" verbs
that permits interrogative (w/z-) complements. We have seen how the view treats wonder
(which takes only w/z-complements), and we will say similar things about forgets
,
12
regrets
,
discovers
,
guesses, learns, and the rest. To forget-wh (where the keys are, for
example) is to forget what the answer to a question is. To leam-w/? is to learn what the
answer to some question is. And so on. Aside from theoretical simplicity, this uniform
treatment of the attitude verbs indeed seems to offer a very intuitive picture of each of the
phenomena in question.
One may here worry that the proposed view entails that “know” is lexically
ambiguous. After all, on the proposed view, the “know” that occurs in knowledge-w//
ascription sentences expresses a dyadic relation between a subject and a question. But the
“know" that occurs in knowledge-^/ ascription sentences does not express such a
relation. In knowledge-that ascription sentences, “know” either expresses a dyadic
relation between a subject and a proposition (if the traditionalists is right) or it expresses
a triadic relation between a subject, a proposition, and a question (if the contrastivist is
right). But there is good evidence that “know” is not lexically ambiguous in this way (for
example, the “know” that occurs in knowledge-vv/? ascription sentences and the “know”
that occurs in knowledge-//*^ ascription sentences do not translate into different words in
other languages).
However, I think the worry is misplaced. Neither view of knowledge-?/?^
ascriptions forces us to accept that “know” is lexically ambiguous in this troubling sense.
Suppose we accept the traditional view of knowledge -?/**?/1 ascriptions. Accepting that
“knows” expresses a relation such that we can sometimes stand in that relation to one
kind of thing (namely questions) and at other times stand in that relation to another kind
of thing (namely, propositions) does not force us to accept that “knows” is lexically
ambiguous. After all it seems that there are lots of relations like this— relations that can
13
take different kinds of things as their relata. Honor , for example, is a relation that vve can
stand in to various kinds of things— we can honor people, we can honor rules, we can
honor statues, we can honor deities, we can honor vows, etc. Understanding is another
relation that we can stand in to various kinds of entities, notice “I understand the
question,” “I understand that Bush is president,” “I understand Suzy ,” “I understand what
you are going through,” “I understand what you are saying,” and so on. Now it may be
that “understand” is lexically ambiguous (or polysemous) but the mere fact that we can
bear this relation to many different kinds of things does not necessitate that it is so. And
similarly for “know.”
Now things get a bit trickier if we accept Schaffer’s contrastivism about
knowledge-//?*://. If “knows” expresses a two-place relation in some cases and a three-
place relation in others, we might think that that is good evidence that “knows” is
lexically ambiguous. But I believe we still are not forced towards this conclusion. For we
may accept that the knowing that goes on when we know-that is the same knowing that
goes on when we know-wh. For example, we may hold that whenever we know
something, we stand in the knowledge relation to some proposition and some question—
we know the proposition as the answer to the question. Yet we may also claim that not all
knowledge ascriptions need to say all this. Some knowledge ascriptions (knowledge-w/?)
say that the subject knows the answer to a particular question. Other knowledge
ascriptions (knowledge-//?/?/ ascriptions) say that the subject knows a particular
proposition. Either kind of knowledge ascription can be used to accurately represent the
same phenomenon, or the same event in the world. But a knowledge-w/? ascription and a
knowledge-//?/?/ ascription will describe the event in a different way. Each can be used to
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provide the audience with different information and the speaker’s choice of knowledge
ascription will reflect his desire to covey some information rather than another. We can
again see a similarity with other verbs that sometimes take one argument place and other
times take two argument places. If Bob ate spaghetti and I want to tell you about the
event, I may say, “Bob ate.” Alternatively, I may say “There is something that Bob ate.”
Or I may say “Bob ate spaghetti.” In each of these sentences the eating that has gone on
is the same. There is one event or phenomenon. Yet each of these sentences tells you
something different about that event. And still, “eat” and “ate” are not thereby lexically
ambiguous. So whatever we may think about knowledge-that, accepting the proposed
view about knowledge-w/z ascriptions does not force us to accept that “know” is lexically
ambiguous .7
But there is another possible objection in the neighborhood. One may attempt to
resist the parallel between wonder-vv/z and know-\vh by pointing out that “wonder” and
“know” are importantly different in that “know” can take that-clauses at complements
while “wonder” cannot. Perhaps one might think that this is evidence that wonder
ascription and knowledge ascriptions have different logical forms—“wonder” expressing
a relation to a question and ‘know’ either expressing a relation to a proposition or always
expressing a relation to a proposition and a question.
But this move seems too quick. While it is true that some attitude verbs, like
“wonder” can take only interrogative complements, we should note that there are other
attitude verbs, like “believe” that can take only declarative complements. Finally there
are some attitude verbs like “know” that can take both. So, it seems that we should not
7
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this concern.
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thereby conclude that knowledge ascriptions and wonder ascriptions must always have a
different logical form (anymore than we should conclude that belief ascriptions and
knowledge ascriptions must always have a different logical form). Instead, it seems
possible that knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements have the same
logical form as the attitude ascriptions containing verbs that can take only interrogative
complements (like “wonder”), and knowledge ascriptions with declarative complements
have the same logical form as the attitude ascriptions containing verbs that can take only
declarative complements (like “believe”).
Further, one might accept that n/z-complements of knowledge-w/t ascriptions
denote questions but claim that “know” unlike “wonder” projects a third argument place.
So, someone might argue that knowledge-vr/z ascriptions and wonder ascriptions are
similar in expressing some relation between a subject and a question, but that “know”
should take an additional complement for the answer to the question. While this is
possible, I think we lack good reason for thinking that it is so. The parallel surface forms
provide some evidence for thinking that such sentences also have a parallel logical form.
Further, it seems that we have good reason to think that wondering-vv/z and knowing-w/z
really are different relations we can stand in to the same thing— a question; when we
wonder- vv’/z we wonder what the answer to the question is, and when we know -vv/z we
know what the answer to that question is. So absent any evidence for thinking otherwise.
8
I discuss the complement-embedding behavior of the attitude verbs and its possible
significance in Chapter 4.
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it seems most reasonable to accept that our ascriptions of these attitudes simply state that
we do stand in one of these relations to a question
9
Let us take stock. The anti-reductionist is right that in order for a knowledge-vv/z
attribution to be true, the subject must not only know some proposition,/?, that happens to
answer the question denoted by the vv/z-clause, but the subject must know the proposition
as an answer to the question. Contra Schaffer, the proposition expressed by a knowledge-
vv/z attribution does not contain the answer to the indirect question, but contra Brogaard,
the proposition expressed by a knowledge-vv/z attribution does contain the question. Yet it
seems we still do not have a complete response to the question with which we began.
What does it take for me to know where you can buy an Italian newspaper? For me to
know where you can buy an Italian newspaper there must be some proposition that is an
answer to your question and that I know as the answer to your question— but what is your
question, exactly, and what counts as an answer to it?
Understanding the Question
Suppose Kevin knows that a small stand in Rome’s Piazza Navona sells the daily
paper; does he know where Lisa can buy an Italian newspaper? The invariantist about
knowledge-vv/z says yes: knowing that Lisa can buy an Italian newspaper in Rome’s
Piazza Navona is sufficient for knowing where Lisa can buy an Italian newspaper. 1(1 The
contextualist about knowledge-vv/z, however, sometimes disagrees." According to the
9
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
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See Bach (2005) and Braun (2006) for a defense of invariantism about knowledge-vv/z.
1
1
Here I use the term “contextualist” to refer to those who are contextualists about
knowledge-vv/z and to refer to those who are contextualists about interrogatives. It seems
that, in many cases, those who are contextualists about knowledge-vv/z are contextualists
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contextualist, whether or not Kevin’s knowledge amounts to knowing the answer to
Lisa’s question depends on the context of utterance. Suppose Lisa and Kevin are standing
on the comer in Cambridge and Lisa utters the following interrogative sentence to Kevin,
(9) Where can one buy an Italian newspaper?
And suppose Kevin responds by uttering ( 10)
(10) One can buy an Italian newspaper in Rome
In uttering (9) Lisa may not be expressing a question to which the proposition Kevin
expressed in uttering (10) is an answer. The contextualist may claim that the question
being asked in any utterance of an interrogative sentence can vary from context to
context; so the proposition that is required to properly answer the question also varies
from context to context.
It is likely that in the imagined case Lisa was interested in knowing of a local
place at which could buy an Italian newspaper— one within reasonable driving distance.
On the contextualist picture then, because Kevin did not inform her of a local place at
which she could buy an Italian newspaper, Kevin did not answer the question Lisa asked.
On the invariantist picture, however, Kevin does indeed answer the question that Lisa has
asked when Kevin utters (10). The invariantist recognizes that Lisa will not be satisfied
by Kevin’s response, nevertheless, according to invariantist, we should claim that the
following sentence is, strictly speaking, true:
about knowledge-w/z because they think that the question being asked with a certain
interrogative sentence can vary from context to context. Certainly one can be a
contextualist about knowledge-w/z in other ways, but I am not concerned with the other
kinds of contextualism about knowledge-w/z here.
1
9
See Boer and Lycan (1986) for a defense of contextualism about knowledge-w/zo.
Schaffer (2007) also defends a kind of contextualism about knowledge-w/z.
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(11) Kevin knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
The contextualist, on the other hand would claim that in the context described (11)
expresses a false proposition.
I think the disagreement between the invariantist and the contextualist lies mainly
in their disagreement regarding the semantics of questions. The contextualist typically
claims that interrogative sentences express (and w/?-clauses denote) sets of alternatives;
these sets of alternatives are the possible answers to the question. Questions, then, are
partitions on logical space; the cells of the partition are the question’s possible answers
and these are determined by the speaker’s context. So suppose for simplicity’s sake, that
there are only two stores in the vicinity— a CVS and a Target. When Kevin utters (9) in
this context, he expresses a question with two possible answers. Thus the possibilities
generated in this context are as follows: {one can buy an Italian newspaper at CVS, one
can buy an Italian newspaper at Target}. However in a different context, one with
different relevant alternatives as answers, the question expressed by the interrogative
sentence (9) would be different. If, say, (9) was uttered in a context in which each of the
European capitals was a relevant possible answer.
Exclusive questions— questions with one exhaustive and complete answer (like
those expressed by the interrogatives, “What chemical compound is this?” “Which of the
students passed the exam?” and “Is there a goldfinch or a canary in the garden?”)— are
associated with a space of possibilities or a partition whose elements are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive sets of propositions. Knowing the answer to an exclusive
question involves ruling out each of the false alternatives, or narrowing down the space
of possibilities to only one.
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Critics of this understanding of questions may point out that some interrogatives
sometimes seem to express questions that do not require an exhaustive and complete
answer. For example, on one reading of (9) (often called the “mention-some” reading), it
seems that an exhaustive specification of all the contextually relevant places where Italian
newspapers are sold is unnecessary for giving a complete answer to the question. In other
words, even if CVS and Target both sell Italian newspapers, Lisa might answer Kevin’s
question simply by claiming that one can buy an Italian newspaper at CVS. But there are
several possible moves to be made in the face of this worry. First, one might claim that
Lisa really does need to give an exhaustive list in order to answer Kevin’s question
completely but claim that in some contexts partial answers to the question are perfectly
adequate for the inquirer’s purposes. In other words, one could hold that mention-some
answers are not complete answers in a semantic sense, but nevertheless are able to
function as complete answers pragmatically. Secondly one may offer a more
sophisticated picture of non-exclusive or mention-some questions. One way to do so is to
follow Higgenbotham's (1996) proposal regarding quantifying into questions. On this
proposal, complex quantified questions are constructed from elementary ones.
Quantifying into questions generates a structure of “blocs”, where each bloc is a set of
elementary questions. On Higginbotham’s view, to successfully and completely answer a
complex question then, one needs only to answer all of the questions in one of the blocks.
So, on this view of complex questions, we can understand the mention-some reading of
(9) as asking something like the following, ‘pick any Italian newspaper and answer this
1
3
The alleged problem and this possible reply are discussed in Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1997, 111 1).
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question about it: where can one find it?’ So for each choice of Italian newspapers (in
Kevin’s vicinity), a bloc containing the question about its location is formed; and a
successful answer to Kevin’s question requires answering the question in one of its
blocs.
14
Braun (2006) indicates that he does not understand questions in this way but does
not here explain how he does understand them. Bach (2005), too, seems to reject the
picture without presenting an alternative proposal. But the claims that Braun and Bach
each make seem incompatible with the view the contextualist endorses. For if questions
denote sets of alternatives and the worlds in which Italian newspapers are sold only in
Italy are not included in the set of alternatives denoted by Lisa’s interrogative sentence,
then it is impossible that the proposition expressed by Kevin’s utterance be an answer to
Lisa’s question.
There are several reasons to be a contextualist about knowledge-w/z. For starters,
it seems that the truth-values of knowledge-vv/z ascriptions do vary from context to
context. Consider for example. Matt, a school teacher who is testing his class on the
names of European cities, and asks, “Where can one buy an Italian newspaper?”
According to the contextualist, the question expressed by Matt’s utterance in this context
is a different one than that expressed by Lisa’s utterance in the former context. Suppose
Matt’s student, Nina, were to reply, “One can buy an Italian newspaper in Rome.” In this
case, we would judge that the student’s response did answer the question that the teacher
posed. So, although Kevin and Nina have the same information and utter the very same
sentence, the proposition expressed answers the question that Matt asked in the classroom
14
This possibility is discussed in Hagstrom (2003, 197) and Harrah (2002, 36-37).
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setting, but does not answer the question that Lisa asked in the Cambridge setting. In the
Cambridge context we will judge that Kevin does not know where one can buy an Italian
newspaper. But in the classroom context we will judge that the student does know where
one can buy an Italian newspaper. In this way, the contextualist seems to get things right
in attributing knowledge to the student but in failing to attribute knowledge to Kevin.
The invariantist, on the other hand, will claim that the very same question has
been expressed by Lisa’s and by Matt’s utterances and that each of the responses has
answered the question asked. According to the invariantist, then, in both the Cambridge
context and the classroom context it is, strictly speaking, true that the responder knows
the answer to the question. Braun (2006, 20-21 ) acknowledges that contextualism can
better account for our intuitions in these cases. Yet Braun is not concerned; he claims that
the contextualist, too, must attribute systematic mistakes to ordinary speakers. According
to Braun (2006, 21), while the invariantist must accept that we often misjudge the truth-
value of knowledge attributions, the contextualist attributes systematic ignorance of
context-sensitivity to ordinary speakers. For the contextualist must accept that there are
occasions in which we attempt to report another speaker's attitude ascriptions and, failing
to recognize that the context has changed, end up saying something false. The alleged
problem arises when we attempt to “echo” attitude ascriptions— that is when we attempt
to recount an attitude ascription made by someone else. The phenomenon is best
illustrated by example. Suppose that, in the classroom, Oliver overhears Nina (the
student) answer Matt’s question, and Oliver utters the following to Patty:
(12) Nina knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
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Later, on the streets of Cambridge, Patty overhears Lisa ask Kevin where one can buy an
Italian newspaper. Patty turns to her companion and utters,
(13) Oliver said that Nina knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
According to the contextualist, Patty’s utterance expresses a false proposition. For, on
the contextualist picture, it is Patty’s context that determines which question is denoted
by the vv/i-clause and Oliver has made no claims about Nina’s knowledge of the answer
to that question. But, according to Braun, it seems that Patty says something true. Even
worse, the contextualist must accept that if Patty were to utter
( 14) Oliver did not say that Nina knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper,
she would be saying something true! Braun argues that this consequence of contextualism
is unpalatable and this failure of “echoing” does not arise if invariantism is true. If we
want to report a knowledge attribution made by another we can simply disquote that
person to accurately report his or her attribution.
While it is tme that failures of echoing may arise in cases like this, the
contextualist need not be worried. Contra Braun, cases like this do not seem to point to
any widespread or “systematic” ignorance of context-sensitivity on the part of ordinary
speakers. In fact it seems to me that contextualism is often adopted because it
acknowledges and accounts for ordinary speakers’ awareness or knowledge of context
sensitivity. That is, the contextualist attempts to explain why ordinary speakers believe
that different utterances of the same knowledge attribution can vary in truth-value over
different contexts— this is precisely the intuition that the contextualist wants to capture.
So it seems that failures of echoing arise not because ordinary speakers are unaware of
the context-sensitivity of knowledge-vv/? attributions. Rather it seems that ordinary
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speakers generally recognize the context sensitivity of knowledge-w/z attributions but
sometimes fail to know that the context has shifted. In fact, if some ordinary speaker had
observed the whole sequence of events it seems to me that that observer would point out
that Matt and Kevin seem to be asking different questions. So the case does not provide
reason to think that we are systematically ignorant of context-sensitivity of knowledge-
wh ascriptions but only that someone may be ignorant about a particular instance of a
context shift. But of course, this is no problem for the contextualist.
Braun (2006, 23) seems to think that his second problem for contextualism is even
more troubling. He wants us to consider the following alleged fact: ‘Mark Twain is a
famous author’ is an answer to the question, ‘Who is Mark Twain?’ Now assume further
that Helen knows that Mark Twain is a famous author but does not know that Mark
Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn. According to the contextualist, in a context in which the
participants are only interested in the identification of the authors of various famous texts,
we are forced to say that Helen knows an answer to the question of who Mark Twain is,
but she does not know who Mark Twain is.
But this is not troubling to the contextualist. For, in using the locution ‘the
question of who Mark Twain is’ in claiming that Helen knows an answer to the question
of who Mark Twain is, we are referring to a different question than that to which we refer
when we use the same locution in claming that Helen does not know who Mark Twain is.
If we think of questions as sets of alternatives, then the explanation of this phenomenon is
straightforward: two different questions are referred to in our sentence, and it is perfectly
reasonable to believe that one may know the answer to one of these questions without
knowing the answer to the other. While it could certainly be misleading to utter sentences
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in which we refer to two different questions using the very same w/j-clause, we would not
do so in any ordinary context.
To see that this is not troubling, consider a similar scenario: Suppose you know
that Helen deposited her paycheck at the bank this morning. Suppose there is also a bank
of a river where you and your friends typically gather for breakfast, but which Helen
missed out on today. You might (if you were crazy!) utter, “There is a bank that Helen
went to today but Helen didn't go to the bank today.” And we can properly interpret your
sentence as expressing a true proposition, though we certainly would not do well to utter
it in any ordinary context. If we did want to express the proposition we had in mind, we
would likely disambiguate so that our audience would understand. The contextualist will
suggest we do the same with Braun’s apparently troubling sentence.
So it seems that neither alleged problem that Braun raises is a genuine problem
for the contextualist. Of course if invariantism better captures our intuitions, then this is
reason in itself for embracing the view. But it seems that Braun’s theory is wildly
unintuitive, and his primary example of his theory in action illustrates this. Suppose all
you know about a person named “Hong Oak Yun,” is that she is a person taller than three
inches. Now I ask you: do you know who Hong Oak Yun is? Of course the answer is no;
you do not know who Hong Oak Yun is purely on the basis of this information. But
Braun claims that you do. For on his view, if you know an answer to the question that is
(always) expressed by the following interrogative,
(15) Who is Hong Oak Yun?
then you know who Hong Oak Yun is. And, on his view,
(16) Hong Oak Yun is a person over three inches tall
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expresses an answer to the question expressed by (15). Further, Braun (2006, 10) claims
that if (16) is an answer to the question expressed by (15) in one context then it is an
answer to the question in every context. I claim that this is an especially bad example
because it is not clear that there is any actual context in which the proposition that Hong
Oak Yun is a person over three inches tall is an answer to the question of who Hong Oak
Yun is. A view that entails that (16) is sometimes an answer to (15) is unintuitive, but one
that entails that (16) is always an answer to (15) seems even more troubling. Of course,
on the view proposed in this paper (16) will likely never come out as an answer to the
question expressed by (15), because it is unlikely that an actual inquirer would ever ask a
question that partitioned the possible worlds into a set in which Hong Oak Yun is over
three inches tall and a set in which she is not. And this seems to be an attractive result of
the current proposal.
I suspect that Braun’s conception of questions may be playing a large role here in
thinking that (15) and ( 16) constitute a question-and-answer pair. It seems that no view of
questions as partitions on logical space is going to give Braun the results he is looking
for. And it seems that we may be hesitant to adopt the picture Braun has in mind if it does
imply the data that Braun is using. Further, a view of this sort does not fit well with
Ludlow (2005) and Hintikka’s (1981) picture of inquiry discussed above.
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Recall that,
on this picture, inquiry begins in wonder (asking a question) and when all goes well ends
in knowledge (answering the question). Now suppose that Braun is right that we all know
who Hong Oak Yun is. The inquiry has come to an end; so it no longer makes sense to
15 Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer here.
26
wonder who Hong Oak Yun is. But certainly it does make sense to wonder who Hong
Oak Yun is. In fact, I am wondering about this right now.
Additionally, it seems that a pragmatic explanation of the apparent change in
truth-value does not adequately explain what goes on in many situations. Imagine a
teacher was giving a history exam and asked, “Who was George Washington?” If a
student answered, "George Washington was a person over three inches tall.” The teacher
would rightly claim that the student had not answered the question. If the student had
given an answer to the question, and the problem was only that the student had not given
the teacher an answer that satisfied him, it seems that the student would have grounds for
complaint. After all, the student answered the question truly.
Further, consider an example that the contextualist thinks is an example of a
knowledge attribution whose truth-value can vary from context to context. 16 Suppose
Rachel’s friend, Sam has recently uncovered some new information about Rachel’s
heritage and has discovered that Rachel is the rightful heir to the Swedish throne. He
rushes over to Rachel’s house and joyously shouts, “Rachel you don’t know who you
are!” Is Sam right? It seems that Sam is right in that Rachel does not know that she is the
rightful heir to the throne rather than some lowly pauper. Even though Rachel many
know several other things about herself (including, of course, that she is more than three
inches tall), she does not know this important fact about herself. If Terry was next to Sam
during the unveiling of the key information, she might turn to Sam and ask, “Does Rachel
know who she is?” and Sam would correctly reply, “No, Rachel does not know who she
is.” And it seems that Sam would, in uttering this sentence, be uttering something true.
16
The example is similar to one from Sterelny (1988, 655).
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Surely if Sam were to reply “Of course, Rachel knows that she is more than three inches
tall” Terry would claim that Sam did not answer her question— “But does she know who
she isT Terry would likely exclaim again. So the contextualist view seems to better
capture our intuitions about the truth-values of various knowledge attributions.
Finally, Braun’s theory seems to allow us to “echo” in cases in which echoing
seems to produce /hr/sc propositions. So for example, suppose later in the day Rachel was
hit on the head. Luckily she suffers no symptoms as Uri confirms by quizzing Rachel
about her name, birth date, the current year, and so on. Vicky rushes over, and concerned
about the possibility of amnesia asks, “Does Rachel know who she is?” Terry overhears
Vicky’s question and replies, “Sam said that Rachel does not know who she is.” But of
course, this response of Terry’s is false because the indirect question in Vicky’s wh-
clause denotes a different set of alternatives that the indirect question in the w/?-clause of
Terry’s report. So while Braun may attempt to explain the impropriety here by appealing
to the idea of satisfactory answers (Terry’s report of Sam’s attribution does not provide
information that should satisfy Vicky), there seems to be more going on. Indeed it seems
that someone who had witnessed the whole sequence of events would point out that Sam
and Vicky were concerned with different questions.
It may appear that the contextualist and the invariantist are at a stalemate. The
contextualist attempts to capture our intuitions about the truth-values of ordinary
knowledge ascriptions but the invariantist will offer a pragmatic explanation for each of
the apparently troubling cases. Further, the contextualist and the invariantist must each
tell a story about some primafacie failures of disquotation. Since it seems that the
difference between the two camps depends heavily on their different understanding of
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questions, we might wonder about the independent advantages of adopting each. Indeed it
seems that there are many good reasons for thinking that questions denote their
alternatives. First, as Higginbotham (1996) points out, this understanding of questions
allows us to distinguish between wrong answers and irrelevant remarks. On this view, if a
person attempts to answer some question by asserting a proposition that is one of its
possible answers, but is not a true proposition, that person gives a wrong answer. On the
other hand, if a person attempts to answer some question by asserting a proposition that is
not one of its possible answers, then (true or false) that person makes an irrelevant
remark. Suppose Lisa wants to know where she can buy an Italian newspaper (locally).
Suppose Kevin tells her that she can buy an Italian newspaper at the local CVS. But
suppose this is false— the local CVS does not sell Italian newspapers. We would judge
that Kevin gave a wrong answer. On the other hand, suppose Will responds to Lisa's
question by asserting,
(17) One can buy a French newspaper in Paris.
In uttering (17) Will expressed a true proposition, but his assertion was irrelevant. That
one can buy a French paper in Paris is not one of the alternatives in the set denoted by
Lisa’s question. So, in contrast to Kevin, we would not claim that Will gave a right
answer or a wrong answer to the question; we would judge instead that he made an
irrelevant comment. We see then, that the proposed theory of questions distinguishes
between wrong answers and irrelevant remarks in a natural way; yet it seems that the
understanding of questions that Braun and Bach are working with does not have this
feature.
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Another advantage of the alternative-denoting understanding of questions, is that
it offers a natural understanding of the distinction between partial and complete answers
to a question. To see why, consider the following example. Suppose that there are ten
students and the teacher is wondering who passed the test. She asks,
(18) Which of the students passed the test?
Suppose A1 knows that Betty passed the test but is not sure about anyone else. Suppose
Chris knows that Betty and Daisy passed the test but is not sure how anyone else did. As
it turns out, Betty, Daisy, and Eric are the only students who passed the test. Suppose Fay
knows how each student performed on the test. It seems that Fay knows the complete
answer to the question and hence knows which of the students passed the test. It seems
that A1 and Chris do not know which of the students passed the test. But it seems that
each knows a partial answer to the question, and it seems that Fay knows more than Chris
but that Chris knows more than Al. The proposed understanding of questions can account
for this. Al's answer and Chris’s answer are incomplete or only partial answers because
each is incompatible with some of the other possibilities in the set of possibilities denoted
by the question, but each is also compatible with more than one of the possibilities in the
set. Again, it seems that Braun's proposal has no straightforward way of understanding
this distinction between a partial and a complete answer to a question. For according to
Braun (2006, 6), “a proposition answers a semantic question iff it provides information
about the question’s subject matter.” On this view we may be able to make sense of one
answer’s being more informative than another, but it’s not clear how we can construct
from this the distinction we are after.
17
The example is similar to one found in Higginbotham (1996, 371-374).
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Finally, modeling questions as sets of alternatives gives us an elegant account of
• •18
presupposition. On this view, the presuppositions of a question are the propositions
which are true in all the available possibilities. That is, some question Q presupposes
proposition p if and only if every alternative denoted by Q entails p. Consider, for
example, the leading question, “Have you stopped smoking yet?” This question generates
the following alternatives: {You have stopped smoking. You have not stopped smoking}.
Either answer to the question entails that you used to smoke; thus, that you used to smoke
is a presupposition of the question. Or consider the question expressed by “Is there a
goldfinch or a canary in the garden?” The question presupposes that there is a bird in the
garden and that there is either a goldfinch or a canary in the garden. These propositions
are presupposed by the question because the possible answers to the question each entail
that the propositions are true. Allowing us to model presupposition in this way is an
attractive feature of the current understanding of questions and it is difficult to see how
another conception of questions can offer such a natural account of presupposition.
I have argued that the proposed understanding of questions has several
advantages; it allows us to distinguish between wrong answers and irrelevant remarks, it
offers us a natural understanding of the distinction between a partial and a complete
answer to a question and it offers a natural account of presupposition. To my mind, this
understanding of questions is attractive enough that we should adopt it on its own merits.
That this understanding of questions seems to commit us to contextualism about
knowledge -wh is, I think, another advantage given the independently attractive features
of being a contextualist about knowledge-w/z.
IX
cf. Higginbotham (1996)
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Conclusion
To sum up, a question denotes the set of alternatives that are its possible answers.
A subject knows the answer to the question (knows-wh) if and only if that subject can
choose the true alternative— that is if the subject can recognize the answer to the question
as the answer to the question. A given interrogative sentence can be used to express
various different questions in different contexts. It is certainly possible for a subject to
know the answer to one of these questions without knowing the answer to the others. At
the beginning of some inquiry, the set of alternatives is before our minds; we wonder
what the answer to the question is. As we gather evidence, we are able to rule out some of
the false alternatives. When we have ruled out each of the false alternatives, we stand in
the knowledge relation to the very question with which we began and we know the
answer to that question.
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CHAPTER 2
KNOWING HOW AND KNOWING HOW
If we accept the account of knowledge-vv/? outlined in Chapter 1 , we may wonder
whether know ledge-/? *?vv should be treated in the same way. It may seem natural to treat
knowledge ascriptions with interrogative /?ow-complements in the same way as we treat
knowledge ascriptions with any other kind of interrogative complement, but I think that
knowledge-/?cw deserves special consideration given that many philosophers have argued
that knowing how is a unique kind of knowledge.
In their paper, “Knowing How,” Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001)
defend the hitherto unpopular view that knowledge-/?ow is simply a species of
knowledge-//?*?/. In section one of this chapter I discuss Stanley and Williamson’s critique
of Gilbert Ryle’s (1946, 1949) arguments on knowledge-/?<?vv. I claim that Stanley and
Williamson’s criticisms of Ryle’s regress argument fail to cast doubt on the claim that
knowledge- how is fundamentally distinct from knowledge-//?*?/. In section two I explain
and evaluate Stanley and Williamson’s positive proposal— their view that knowledge-
how is a species of knowledge-//?*?/. I argue that their view faces several problems. In
section three I present my own view of knowIedge-/?*?u\ I argue that knowledge-/?me
attributions are ambiguous and I propose a new understanding of one sense of
knowledge-/?ow. I claim that on one disambiguation, knowledge-/?*^’ ascriptions are
materially equivalent to certain knowledge-//?*?/ ascriptions. Hence this type of
know!edge-/?ow is not fundamentally distinct from knowledge-//?*?/. On this
disambiguation, knowledge-/?ovv ascriptions express a relation between a knower and a
question—just like all knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements.
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Stanley and Williamson on Ryle
Before explaining their thesis that knowledge-/?#vv is a species of knowledge-//?#/,
Stanley and Williamson (2001 , 412-7) attempt to dismantle Ryle’s argument against the
view that he calls the “intellectualist legend.” According to Stanley and Williamson
(2001 , 412), the intellectualist doctrine just is the view that knowledge-/?#vc is a species
of knowledge-//?#/. So Stanley and Williamson suggest that Ryle’s argument is an
argument for the conclusion that knowledge-/?#vr is not a species of knowledge-//?#/— or
that knowledge-/?#w is fundamentally distinct from knowledge-//?#/. Let us begin by
taking a look at Ryle’s argument. Stanley and Williamson point out that Ryle’s argument
shows up in two main passages of his writing. The first passage appears in his paper,
“Knowing How and Knowing That” (1946). Here he writes,
I rely largely on variations of one argument. I argue that the prevailing
doctrine [the intellectualist doctrine] leads to vicious regresses, and these
in two directions. (1) If the intelligence exhibited in any act, practical or
theoretical, is to be credited to the occurrence of some ulterior act of
intelligently considering regulative propositions, no intelligent act,
practical or otherwise, could ever begin... (2) If a deed, to be intelligent,
has to be guided by the consideration of a regulative proposition, the gap
between that consideration and the practical application of the regulation
has to be bridged by some go-between process which cannot by the
presupposed definition itself be an exercise of intelligence and cannot, by
definition, be the resultant deed.
The second passage appears in his book. The Concept ofMind (1949, 30) where
he writes.
The crucial objection to the intellectualist legend is this. The consideration
of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more
or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be
intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation has first to be
performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility
for anyone ever to break into the circle.
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An examination of these short passages suggests that Ryle’s target is not the view that
knowledge-/*ovv is a species of knowledge-//***/. Rather Ryle seems to be arguing against
the claim that performing any intelligent act requires considering a proposition (namely
the proposition about how to perform the original act). This claim, of course, is very
different from the claim that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-//**??. In fact, the
two claims seem independent of one another. So the conclusion of Ryle’s regress
argument is compatible with knowledge-/**?vv being a species of knowledge-//**?/ or with
the claim that knowledge-/*ow and knowledge-//***/ are fundamentally distinct.
Now Stanley and Williamson (2001 ,413, fn. 6) mention that Ryle may have
intended his argument to tell against more than the claim that knowledge-/**?vv is a species
of knowledge-//***/. But, they claim, his argument is typically taken to establish at least
this conclusion and hence their goal is to determine whether Ryle’s argument is
successful in doing this. But it is not clear to me that those who follow Ryle in thinking
that there is some distinction between knowledge-/*ovv and knowledge-//**?/ do so because
they are convinced by his regress argument. Stanley and Williamson (2001,413) cite one
author, Edward Craig, who references Ryle’s regress argument for the conclusion that
intellectualism is false. But Craig does not here claim that intellectualism is the view that
knowledge-/*ovr is a species of knowledge-//?**/. Instead Craig may be convinced by
Ryle’s claim that not every intelligent act requires the consideration of some proposition.
So it seems to me that rejecting the regress argument will not itself cast doubt on
Ryle’s claim that knowledge-/z*?w> and knowledge-//***/ are fundamentally distinct.
Nevertheless, it seems that the conclusion of his regress argument may bear on this claim.
For, if knowledge-/*ovv is a species of knowledge-//***/, and the employment of
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knowledge-/z<9w always requires some employment of knowledge-?/^?, then it indeed
seems that no knowledge-//ow could ever get off the ground. So it seems to me that Ryle’s
regress argument is worth evaluating. Let us turn to the argument that Stanley and
Williamson consider. Stanley and Williamson (200 1,413) claim that Ryle’s main
argument depends on these two premises:
( 1) If one Fs , one employs knowledge-how to F.
(2) If one employs knowledge that p, then one contemplates the proposition that p.
They suggest that Ryle uses these two premises to get a reductio of the claim that the
content of knowledge-/;ow to F is, for some 0, the proposition that 0(F). According to
Stanley and Williamson the reductio is supposed to run as follows: Suppose Hannah Fs.
By (1), Hannah knows how to F. By the reductio assumption, Hannah employs
knowledge that 0(F). So by (2) Hannah contemplates the proposition that 0(F). Since
contemplating 0(F) is an act, we reapply (1), so Hannah knows how to contemplate that
0(F). Call this act of contemplating that 0(F), “C.” By applying the reductio assumption
again, we get that Hannah employs the knowledge that 0(C). By (2), Hannah must
contemplate the proposition that 0(C). And hence the regress.
Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle’s argument. They claim that both (1) and (2)
are false, and hence the reductio is unsuccessful. According to Stanley and Williamson
(2001 ,414-5), ( 1 ) is false because there are many things that we do that without
employing knowledge-//ow. Digesting food, for example is something we do, without
employing knowledge of how to do it. But this is not a problem for Ryle, because Ryle
does not appeal to (1) in his regress argument. He does appeal to a similar claim, namely
that in performing intelligent action we employ knowledge-/?ovv. As Stanley and
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Williamson point out later (415), it seems reasonable to think that Ryle’s “intelligent
actions” are just actions that are intentional. 19 And Stanley and Williamson seem to accept
that (1) may be true if restricted to such intelligent actions.
Stanley and Williamson reject premise (2) because there are many instances of
employing knowledge that p without contemplating the proposition that p. For example,
as Carl Ginet (1975, 7) points out, I employ my knowledge that pushing on the door
opens the door by doing just that (and hence without my contemplating the proposition
that pushing the door opens the door). But again it seems that Ryle does not appeal to (2)
anywhere in his text. He seems to appeal to a similar claim, the one he thinks embodies
the intellectualists’ doctrine:
(2’) If one employs knowledge how to F, then one contemplates the proposition
that 0(F).
Now Ginet’s example, or something like it, may succeed in showing (2’) to be false: I
employ knowledge how to open the door by pushing on it and in doing so do not
contemplate any proposition. But Ryle would be happy to reject (2’)— in fact, the purpose
of Ryle’s regress argument is precisely to show that claims like (2’) are false. Indeed, just
before he presents his regress argument, Ryle gives his own examples to show that (2’) is
false: a witty person will crack jokes without contemplating any proposition about how to
19
Sometimes by “intelligent acts” Ryle seems to be using the term literally— that is. he
seems to want to pick out acts that can properly be described as intelligent— or acts to
which the adjective “intelligent” can be meaningfully applied (1945, 2, 5, 6 ,14; 1949, 28,
32). But it seems that on Ryle’s view we would call only intentional acts “intelligent” or
“stupid”— it would not make sense to cause some non-intentional act “intelligent.”
Elsewhere he seems to suggest that acts are intelligent if they are done on purpose (1949,
25, 28, 32). He stresses that intelligent acts are to be distinguished from acts done out of
habit (1945, 15; 1949,28).
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do so and the apt arguer will construct an argument without thinking about any
proposition about how to do so (Ryle, 1949, 30).
So it seems that there are several moves in the above argument that Ryle would
reject. Earlier in their paper Stanley and Williamson summarize Ryle’s conclusion in this
way: “//'the thesis that knowledge-//mv is a species of knowledgQ-that required each
manifestation of knowledge-//ovv to be accompanied by a distinct action of contemplating
a proposition... then no knowledge-//ovv could ever be manifested” (Stanley and
Williamson 2001 , 413, emphasis mine). Ryle might endorse this argument, but he can
hold that the antecedent is false. His infinite regress argument is designed to attack the
view that each application of knowledge-Zzovv requires contemplating a proposition. But
he says nothing about whether this claim or its denial entails that knowledge-//env is a
species of knowledge-////?/. So it seems that we have not yet shown that there is anything
wrong with Ryle’s argument for the conclusion that knowledge-Z/ow does not need to be
accompanied by a distinct action of contemplating a proposition. In fact, Stanley and
Williamson seem to agree with Ryle’s conclusion of the regress argument.
Now Ryle does want to deny that knowledge-//ow is a species of knowledge-////?/,
but he does not use the regress argument to do so. So it is certainly worth looking at
Ryle’s argument for the claim that knowledge-///?vv is distinct from knowledge-////?/. It
seems to me that Ryle’s argument for accepting a distinction between knowledge-//ovv and
knowledge-//;*:// relies heavily on our intuitions. He points to many cases in which an
individual seems to know how to do something yet is unable to articulate this knowledge
in a way that seems necessary for having any relevant knowledge-////?/. For example, he
suggests that, “the wit, when challenged to cite the maxims, or canons, by which he
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constructs and appreciates jokes, is unable to answer. He knows how to make good jokes
and how to detects bad ones, but he cannot tell us or himself any recipes for them” (Ryle,
1949, 30). Further, he points to cases in which it seems we do have the relevant
knowledge-f/*<F, yet it seems we would not ascribe knowledge-/zovv. So for example, “The
boy is not said to know how to play [chess] if all that he can do is to recite the rules
accurately. He must be able to make the required moves” (Ryle, 1949, 41).
Interestingly, Stanley and Williamson’s argument against Ryle’s positive proposal
also depends heavily on our intuitions. According to Stanley and Williamson (2001 ,416)
Ryle claims that ascriptions of the form ‘jc knows how to F' merely ascribe to jc the ability
to F. They suggest (2001 , 416) that such a view is simply false because there are cases in
which we ascribe knowledge-/?on’ without ascribing the relevant ability. For example, we
may say that a ski instructor knows how to perform a particular stunt even if she does not
have the ability to perform it. Or we may say of a master pianist who has tragically lost
both arms that she knows how to play the piano, even if she has lost her ability to do so.
But we would not claim that a lottery winner knows how to win the lottery even though
he is clearly able to do so (Stanley & Williamson, 2001 , 416).
However it seems that Ryle does not simply equate knowledge-/zovv to F with the
ability to F. Instead he writes that, “knowing how... is a disposition, but not a single-track
disposition like a reflex or a habit. Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the
applications of criteria but they are not tandem operations of theoretically avowing
maxims and putting them into practice” (Ryle, 1949,46). Further, Ryle (1949,42) is
careful to point out important features of dispositions that would distinguish dispositions
from mere abilities. Ryle (1949, 43) also notes that one may have the disposition to F
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without ever being in the circumstances to F. For example, one may have the disposition
to play the piano, even if, due to unfortunate circumstances, one is unable to play the
piano. So it seems that the tragic piano player is not a counterexample to Ryle’s theory.
Appealing to dispositions will also allow Ryle to avoid problematic implications in
cases like the lottery-winner. There is some sense in which every lottery entrant is able to
win the lottery. Yet, we would not say that the winner of the lottery knows how to win the
lottery. Ryle can explain this: having a disposition to F must be contrasted with getting
lucky with respect to F. So the lottery winner can win the lottery (as evidenced by the fact
that he does win), but we would not say that the lottery winner is disposed to win the
lottery. Instead he just got lucky. Ryle (1949,45) illustrates the importance of such a
distinction by discussing a solider who has hit a bull's-eye. If the soldier truly knows how
to hit the bull's-eye, we expect that he will be able to do it again, we expect to see
progress in successive attempts, and we expect that he will be able to advise others
attempting to accomplish the task. If the soldier was merely lucky, he will have trouble
hitting the target again, he may not show any progress, and he may not be able to advise
others or offer tips for success. If the soldier was merely lucky in hitting the bull's-eye we
will not attribute knowledge-/?^ to hit a bull’s-eye to him even though he is clearly able
to hit a bull’s-eye sometimes. So we see that Ryle’s theory has an explanation of such
intuitions that would not be available to him if he accepted the knowledge-/zovv/ability
synonymy that is often attributed to him.
With respect to the ski instructor, it seems as though Ryle (and many others) will
simply deny Stanley and Williamson's intuition— if the ski-instructor is unable to
(somewhat reliably) perform the complicated trick, then she does not know how to
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perform the trick. So it seems that Stanley and Williamson have given us inadequate
reasons for rejecting the thesis that knowledge-how is fundamentally distinct from
knowledge-r/zflr. Nevertheless, their theory of knowledge-/*ovv, if true, would provide a
unified account of knowledge-/mvv and knowledge-r/wr and this would certainly speak in
favor of the view. Let us then turn to Stanley and Williamson’s positive proposal.
Stanley and Williamson on Knowledge-frow
According to Stanley and Williamson, for s to know how to F is for there to be
some contextually relevant way w such that s knows that vv is a way of Fing. Stanley and
Williamson do not have much to say here about the metaphysics of ways, but they
mention that ways of engaging in actions are properties of token events. In their paper
they work with a Russellian understanding of propositions, so propositions are ordered
sequences of properties and objects. On their view then, Hannah knows how to ride a
bike if she stands in the knowledge relation to a proposition: the proposition containing a
way of riding a bicycle and some other properties and objects. Additionally, this
proposition is entertained by Hannah under a certain mode of presentation.
So suppose that Ann sees Hannah riding a bike and recognizes that she is able to
do so with skill. Upon such a seeing, Ann utters:
( 1 ) Hannah knows how to ride a bike.
According to Stanley and Williamson, Ann’s utterance expresses a true proposition—
namely the proposition that there is some way, vv, for Hannah to ride a bike such that
Hannah knows that w is a way of riding a bike. Now suppose that Bob has not seen
Hannah on a bike and has no idea whether Hannah is a skilled rider. Nevertheless, Bob
believes that Hannah knows that one can ride a bike by sitting in the saddle, holding the
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handlebars and pedaling quickly. Suppose Bob wants to attribute this knowledge to
Hannah. On Stanley and Williamson’s view, he can do so by uttering (1). Now suppose
Cara is standing with Hannah watching Dave ride a bike. Both Cara and Hannah know
that the way Dave rides a bike is a way of riding a bike. Suppose Hannah points to Dave
riding and says, “that is a way of riding a bike.” According to Stanley and Williamson, if
Cara wants to attribute this knowledge to Hannah she can utter ( 1 ).
Stanley and Williamson seem to suggest that Ann, Bob, and Cara all attribute
knowledge of the same proposition to Hannah but the propositions is ascribed under a
different guise in each case. The authors suggest that the typical kind of knowledge-//ovv
ascription is one like Ann’s. Stanley and Williamson claim (2001 ,429) that when we
make a knowledge-/?ovv ascription of this sort we attribute knowledge of the relevant
proposition under the practical guise. Further, they suggest that one can know a
proposition under the practical guise and not know it under any other guise. In these
instances we are able to perform the task yet we are unable to articulate the steps
required for doing so.
Stanley and Williamson (2001 , 429) admit that they are unable to say much about
what the practical guise is, yet they argue that this should not be seen as problematic.
They suggest a similar thing happens in the case of self-knowledge. Many philosophers
recognize the need to posit the existence of a personal guise to make sense of the
irreducibility of de se knowledge to ordinary knowledge-r/jc/r. In other words, many
think the following sentences can differ in truth-value:
(2) Evan knows that the man in the mirror’s pants are on fire
(3) Evan knows that his own pants are on fire.
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even when Evan is the man in the mirror. Some have claimed that what is going on here
is that Evan knows a proposition under one guise yet fails to know it under another
guise. The guise involved in (3) is the personal guise. Although we are unable to say
much about what the personal guise is, we need to recognize that it exists in order to
make sense of the possible difference in truth value between sentences like (2) and (3).
Hence Stanley and Williamson (2001 , 428-9) suggest we should be willing to do the
same with practical guises— although we cannot say much about practical guises, we
need to recognize that they exist in order to make sense of certain true knowledge-/zow
ascriptions.
Stanley and Williamson’s proposal faces several problems. First it seems that the
acquisition of knowledge-/jovv is often gradual in a way that knowledge-r/?<7f is not. If we
are learning how to do something— if we are acquiring some skill — we tend to get better
and better at that skill over time, indicating that our know-how gradually increases over
time. We often begin with little or no ability to perform the task— little to no practical
knowledge about how to perform the task— and, as we learn how to do it, we gradually
improve— we gain more know-/mvv. But acquisition of knowledgQ-that is not like this. If
we learn some proposition, we proceed from a time when we did not know it to a time
when we did in something like an instant. Certainly it may take quite a bit of time and
effort to come to learn the proposition but the acquisition itself is not gradual in the way
it often is in acquiring a skill. Further, and relatedly, it seems that knowledge-/mvv comes
in degrees in a way that knowledge-r/ftf/1 does not.‘ So we may say that some expert
211
Stephen Hetherington (2001) denies that knowledge-/iow’ comes in degrees— but he
acknowledges that most philosophers disagree with him about this.
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knows how to shoot an arrow at a target better than a novice, even though they both
know how to do so. But we do not make similar kinds of claims in the case of
knowledge-that. Knowing a proposition is an all-or-nothing kind of thing. It is not the
sort of phenomenon that comes in degrees. Certainly there are experts in a field, and
their expertise has something to do with their propositional knowledge, but it seems as
though these experts know a greater number of propositions than those new to the field,
rather than knowing the propositions better than the beginners.
Consider, for example, two cabinet makers. One is a novice— she is able to make
functional cabinets with regularity that keep her customers happy, but it takes her a long
time, she lacks finesse, and in general does not do as fabulous a job as her teacher. The
teacher is a professional— she is also able to make functional cabinets with regularity.
She is able to do so swiftly and with great finesse and with exceptional craftsmanship. It
seems clear that there is a difference in knowledge here. Both cabinet makers know how
to make a cabinet but one is more capable than the other. If Stanley and Williamson are
right, and know-how is a matter of propositional knowledge, then it seems as though the
professional should know more propositions than the novice. After all, it seems that this
is how we become experts in other fields— the professional chemist knows a greater
number of propositions than the student, for example. But Stanley and Williamson are
unable to explain the difference in this way. Suppose, even, that the way in which the
novice and the professional make cabinets is the same. Then, on Stanley and
Williamson’s view, the novice and the professional know the same proposition under the
practical guise. But it seems that the natural way to explain the difference between the
two cabinet makers is as a difference in the level of skill, or know-//6>vv, between the two.
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where a difference in the level of skill cannot be explained by appealing to knowledge of
propositions in any way.
Second, accepting Stanley and Williamson’s proposal about knowledge-how
forces us to posit an asymmetry between knowledge ascriptions and ascriptions of other
attitudes that take an interrogative complement. So Stanley and Williamson (2001,418)
are right that knowledge-//ow in this propositional sense should be understood in the
same way as knowledge-vv//<7/\ knowledge-vv/m, etc. And knowledge-//ovv ascriptions
should be analyzed in the same way that other knowledge-w/z ascriptions are analyzed.
In fact, Brit Brogaard’s analysis of knowledge-w/?, which is discussed in Chapter 1,
mirrors the analysis of knowledge-/?mv that Stanley and Williamson offer. Remember
that Brogaard (forthcoming) argues that vc/f-complement clauses are predicates, and
function semantically like definite and indefinite noun phrase complement clauses like,
‘the kind of bird in the garden’ or ‘a place that sells Italian newspapers.’ So on
Brogaard’s view, utterances of the form ‘
s
knows-wh-F' express propositions of the
form, ‘for some .r, s knows that .r is wh-F' On this account,
(4) Frank knows where the game is being played,
expresses the following proposition:
(4p) For some /, Frank knows that / is where the game is being played.
On Brogaard's view then, to know where the game is being played is to know a place as
a place where the game is being played. Remember also that because Brogaard holds that
the wh -clauses are predicates, knowledge-vc// ascriptions do not actually include any
indirect question on her view.
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Like Brogaard's view then, Stanley and Williamson’s account, although it seems
to offer a unified account of knowledge ascriptions, prevents us from developing a
parallel treatment of the other attitude verbs. For example, Stanley and Williamson must
also posit an asymmetry between knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements
and wonder ascriptions with interrogative complements. On their view, to claim that 5
knows how to F is to claim that there is some way, w, such that 5 knows that w is a way
of Ting. Yet there is no analogous treatment of wonder ascriptions. We do not want to
claim that sentences of the form ‘
s
wonders how to F ’ express that there is some way, w,
such that 5 wonders whether w is a way of Fing. And, like Brogaard’s view, their
account faces similar problems in the face of each of the other attitude verbs, like ‘ask,’
‘forget,’ ‘explore,’ ‘discover’ and so forth, that take interrogative complements.
Finally, it seems that Stanley and Williamson’s view fails to accurately capture
the proposition that is expressed by certain knowledge-/?ow ascriptions. That is, their
view seems to entail a rather unintuitive picture about what gets said when we utter
ordinary knowledge-//ovv sentences. To see this, consider a typical knowledge-/?ovc
ascription like Ann's utterance of ( 1 ). Ann sees Hannah competently riding a bike and
she wants to report to a friend what she has learned from such a seeing. When Ann utters
( 1 ), she conveys the information learned to her friend. If we reflect on the information
imparted by Ann's utterance, it seems that what she expresses just is that Hannah has a
particular skill or capability. When Ann sees Hannah riding a bicycle it seems that she
does not need to come to any conclusions about the propositions that Hannah believes.
And certainly it seems that in uttering ( 1 ) Ann does not thereby convey the information
that Hannah stands in a relation to a certain proposition. So Stanley and Williamson’s
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view seems to involve a very unintuitive account of what we express when we utter
sentences like (1).
A New Understanding of Knowledge-/zow
So let us recap. Ryle seems right that knowledge-/zow ascriptions like Ann’s
utterance of (1) do not express that a person stands in a relation to a particular
proposition but rather express that some person has a particular skill or capability or
disposition. On the other hand, Stanley and Williamson seem right in recognizing that
some knowledge-/*cm’ ascriptions, like Bob’s utterance of ( 1 ) do express that a person
knows some bit of propositional information. It seems that the most reasonable
explanation of this data is that knowledge-/;ovv ascriptions are ambiguous. On one
reading, knowledge-/zow ascriptions ascribe some disposition or skill, while on the other
21
reading they ascribe knowledge of a propositional nature.
There are several reasons for thinking that knowledge how is ambiguous in this
way. As Rosefeldt (2004, 337) notes the locution "knows how” can be translated into
German in two different ways depending on the sense of knowledge-/zow that is being
discussed. The “knows how” in any ordinary utterance of
(1) Hannah knows how to ride a bike.
(like Ann’s utterance) is translated into German using “koennen" meaning “can.” Yet in
certain utterances of ( 1 ), like Bob or Cara's mentioned above, in which the speaker wants
to attribute some sort of propositional knowledge, “knows how” may be correctly
translated into German using “wissen wie” indicating that “knows how” takes on a
21
Others like Ian Rumfitt (2003) and Tobias Rosefeldt (2004) have also suggested that
“knows how” is ambiguous.
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different meaning in these cases. Rumfitt (2003, 160-163) claims that a similar thing
happens in French, Latin, and Greek.
Further, recognizing this ambiguity allows us to explain our intuitions about what
is expressed when we utter various knowledge-Aow ascriptions. For example, when Ann
utters (1), she seems to be expressing the proposition that Hannah is skilled at riding a
bike. Ann seems to be making no claims about which propositions Hannah knows or
which questions Hannah is able to answer. But Bob seems to be expressing something
very different in uttering the very same sentence. Bob is making a claim about which
propositional information Hannah knows and which question Hannah can answer. Notice
also, that recognizing that "knows how” is ambiguous allows us to accept the apparently
competing intuitions recorded by Ryle and Stanley and Williamson. Consider the example
of the ski instructor who is unable to perform a tricky stunt but who can give detailed
instructions about how one would do so. Stanley and Williamson claimed that the
instructor did know how to perform the stunt. Nevertheless Ryle would likely claim that
the ski instructor did not know how to perform the stunt. This apparent disagreement
results from their disambiguating the knowledge-/?on' ascription in two different ways—
Stanley and Williamson interpreting the "knows how” in the propositional sense and Ryle
interpreting the "knows how” in the ability sense. But intuitively there is a reading of
(5) Suzy the ski instructor knows how to perform the loopty loop.
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under which it is true and a reading of (5) under which it is false.
Interestingly, Bengson, Moffett, and Wright (forthcoming, 5-6) have run surveys on
cases similar to this one. They found that if subjects are told a story in which a ski
instructor is able to teach others to successfully perform a trick yet is unable herself to
perform it, an overwhelming majority of the subjects will judge that the instructor knows
how to perform the trick. Bengson, Moffett, and Wright suggest that such results provide
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Additionally, it seems that the two senses of knowledge-/zovv are importantly
different from each other in just the ways described above. Acquisition of knowledge-/iow
in the ability sense is gradual. In learning how to do something we improve gradually
over time. But acquisition of knowledge-/;ovv in the propositional sense is not gradual in
this way. When we learn some propositional knowledge-/mvv, we proceed from a time
when we did not know it to a time when we did in something like an instant. Further it
seems that knowledge-how in the ability sense comes in degrees while knowledge-how in
the propositional sense does not, but is an all-or-nothing kind of thing.
The data, then, lend support to the idea that “knows how” is ambiguous and that
knowledge-//ovv in the ability sense and knowledge-/?<?vv in the propositional sense are
importantly different. Given this ambiguity, it seems that we need two theories of
knowledge-/iow. And it certainly seems that Ryle is concerned with providing a theory
of knowledge-//ovv in the ability sense. Ryle notes some of the complications that arise in
trying to give a theory of this sort. One, it is not clear how consistent a person needs to
be at some task in order to count as knowing how to perform that task. And two, it is
difficult to explain the kind of disposition required for this sort of knowledge-how. But I
will not attempt to evaluate Ryle’s theory here.
support for the claim the 'the folk’ have intuitions that match up with Stanley and
Williamson's and diverge from Ryle's (6). But it seems to me that my ambiguity thesis
can explain this data. It seems that cases like the one presented, in which the researchers
present information about whether a person can answer the question, “How does one F?”
the propositional reading of “knows how” becomes salient and so research subjects are
likely to judge that some knowledge-/;ovv ascription is true only if the subject can answer
the relevant question. But it seems to me that if the researchers had not made such
information explicit, if, for example, the researchers had only provided information about
the instructor’s abilities, then the subjects would have judged that the instructor does not
know how to perform the trick.
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Stanley and Williamson allege to be offering a theory in which all knowledge-
how is a species of knowledge-/1/^//. I have argued that there are reasons for thinking that
we cannot treat all instances of knowledge-/jc>H' in the same way. So we might wonder
about the merits of Stanley and Williamson’s view for treating each of the two kinds of
knowledge-//ow.
I have offered several reasons for thinking that their theory is not a good theory
of knowledge-//ow in the ability sense. First, the theory gives an unintuitive account of
the content of these knowledge-//ovv ascriptions. When we say that someone knows how
to F (in the ability sense of “knows how”) it seems that we are not expressing that that
person stands in some relation to a proposition as Stanley and Williamson suggest.
Second, the theory cannot account for the gradual nature of knowledge-/zcm— that is,
Stanley and Williamson will have difficulty explaining why knowledge-Zzow in the
ability sense is gradual while other knowledge-f/wf is not. So it seems that their view is
not an adequate account of this kind of knowledge-/?e»v.
We may think that their proposal looks more promising as a theory of
knowledge-//ovr in the propositional sense. But I have offered reasons for thinking that it
falls short here as well. For it seems that knowledge-/jow’ ascriptions that report
propositional knowledge-/zow should be treated in the same way as other knowledge
ascriptions with interrogative complements. But the Stanley and Williamson / Brogaard
view of knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements faces several problems.
First, it would not allow a unified treatment of all attitude verbs with interrogative
complements for reasons mentioned earlier. Second, it seems to mischaracterize the
logical form of knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements. On the surface, it
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seems that knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements contain a question at
the level of logical form— namely, the question that the interrogative complement
denotes. When we claim that someone knows where the game is being played, we claim
that that person knows the answer to the question denoted by the vv/z-clause— we claim
that that person knows the answer to the question of where the game is being played.
Similarly, when we claim that someone knows how to bake a cake (in the propositional
sense of knows-how) we claim that that person knows the answer to the question denoted
by the //ovv-clause— we claim that that person knows the answer to the question of how
one bakes a cake.
1 suggest then, that knowledge-/zovv ascriptions that ascribe propositional
knowledge to a subject, like all knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements,
express a relation between a knower and a question. On this view, the logical form of
some knowledge-/zow ascription is KsQ. And to stand in this knowledge relation to a
question is just to know what the answer to the question is. On the preferred view, then,
when Bob utters ( 1 ) he claims that Hannah stands in the knowledge relation to the
question of how one rides a bike. For Hannah to stand in the knowledge relation to this
question is for Hannah to know an answer to the question, “How do you ride a bike?”
Note that this view allows for a unified treatment of each of the attitudes whose
verb permits an interrogative complement. Consider wonder-\vh ascriptions again. As
mentioned in Chapter 1 , it seems likely that a sentence of the form '5 wonders-vv/z’
expresses a relation between a person and a question. Additionally, it seems likely that
the logical form of a wonder-w/z ascription is WsQ. And to stand in this wonder relation
to a question is to wonder what the answer to the question is. Further, at least on the
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surface, it appears that knowledge-w/? ascriptions and wonder-vr/j ascriptions have a
similar logical form. And this view allows us to expand the treatment to each of the
attitude verbs that permits interrogative (wh -) complements. Aside from theoretical
simplicity, this uniform treatment of the attitude verbs indeed seems to offer a very
intuitive picture of each of the phenomena in question.
Conclusion
When we think of a ski instructor who can give detailed instructions for
performing a loopty-loop even though she, herself, is unable to perform one, it seems that
there is a sense in which she knows how to perform a loopty-loop and a sense in which
she does not know how to perform a loopty-loop. This is because “knows how” is
ambiguous. Sentences of the form knows how to F ’ can be used to express at least two
different propositions. We can utter sentences of this form to attribute something like an
ability to the subject or we can utter such sentences to attribute knowledge of a
propositional sort to the subject. Ryle has attempted to provide an account of knowledge-
how of the first kind. I have argued that Stanley and Williamson's criticism does not pose
a genuine problem for the view Ryle defends. Stanley and Williamson have attempted to
provide a uniform treatment of all knowledge-/;ow. I have argued that their view faces
several problems and is not an adequate theory of either type of knowledge-//ow\ I offer a
new theory of knowledge-/*ow ascriptions that ascribe knowledge of a propositional sort.
I argue that they, like other knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements,
express a relation (the knowledge relation) between a subject and a question; to stand in
this knowledge relation to a question is to know the answer to the question. So on this
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view, ^ knows how to F (in the propositional sense of “knows how”) just in case 5 know
the answer to the question of how one Fs.
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CHAPTER 3
EVIDENCE FOR CONTRASTIVISM
In the previous chapters I have discussed knowledge-vc// ascriptions and
knovvledge-/?<9W’ ascriptions and I have suggested that an account of these knowledge
ascriptions may help us develop a better understanding of knowledge-//?*:// ascriptions and
the nature of knowledge in general. Indeed, I think that considerations of knowledge-vc/z
and knowledge-//ovv lend support to a contrastivist picture of knowledge. According to
the epistemic contrastivist, knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a
proposition, and a set of contrastive propositions. Further, the contrastivist holds that
knowledge attributions of the form 'S knows that p’ express that a subject, S stands in the
knowing relation to a proposition,/?, and a set of contrastive propositions, Q.
On this view, then, one knowledge ascription sentence can be used to express
various different propositions. The contrastivist claims that this picture can provide an
explanation for our intuitions about the truth-value of various knowledge attributions.
First, the contrastivist can explain why our knowledge seems to “vanish” in the skeptical
scenarios. For example, in ordinary contexts we think that Paul’s looking out the window
and seeming to see rain falling makes it the case that Paul knows that it’s raining. That is,
in such a context it seems that (1) is true:
(1) Paul knows that it is raining.
But if pressed by the skeptic— if forced to consider the possibility that Paul may actually
be a brain-in-a-vat or that Paul may be being deceived by a Cartesian evil demon, we
22
See for example, Sinnott-Armstrong 2004; Schaffer 2005b; Karjalainen/Morton 2003;
Johnson 2001; Blaauw 2004; and Dretske 1972
54
generally become reluctant to attribute knowledge to Paul. That is, in these contexts, we
generally think that (1) says something false.
So one alleged attraction of contrastivism is that it seems to account for this
change in truth-value. On the contrastivist picture, (1) does express something true in the
ordinary context. Originally when we uttered (1) we expressed something like the
following proposition:
( lp) Paul knows that it is raining rather than that it is sunny.
And our judgment that what was said in this context is true, stems from the fact that we
are able to recognize that (
1 p) is what was said in that context and that ( 1 p) is true.
But, claims the contrastivist, in a different context, when we are forced to
consider the skeptical possibilities, the contrast set shifts. So an utterance of ( 1 ) in a
skeptical scenario expresses a different proposition— something like (lp’)
(lp’) Paul knows that it is raining rather than that he is a brain-in-a-vat being fed
vat images of rain.
And our judgment that what gets said in this context is false accurately reflects that ( lp')
is what gets said in this context, and (lp’) is false.
Similarly, the contrastivist claims that our intuitions about the truth of various
knowledge ascription sentences can shift from context to context even when there are no
skeptical hypotheses on the table. So the truth of an utterance of (2), for example can also
depend on the context:
(2) Suzy knows that Mustard was in the library with the revolver.
The contrastivist will explain this phenomenon in precisely the same way. So suppose
Suzy and the other detectives have determined the location of the crime and the weapon
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involved. Now Suzy is in the library and finds Mustard’s fingerprints on the gun. Does
Suzy know that Mustard was in the library with the revolver? That is, would an utterance
of (2) be true in this context? It seems like (2) does express something true in this case. It
seems like Suzy does know that Mustard was in the library with the revolver.
But suppose instead that Suzy and the detectives have determined the identity of
the criminal and the weapon, but have not yet determined the location of the crime. Now
Suzy finds Mustard’s fingerprints on the gun. Does Suzy know that Mustard was in the
library with the revolver? It seems that she does not. That is, it seems that an utterance of
(2) in this context expresses something false.
The contrastivist claims that his view can account for this data: an utterance of (2)
in the first context expresses something like the following proposition:
(2p) Suzy knows that Mustard rather than Scarlett was in the library with the
revolver.
And (2p) is true. But an utterance of (2) in the second context expresses something like
the following proposition:
(2p’) Suzy knows that Mustard was in the library rather than in the kitchen with
the revolver.
And (2p') is false. So contrastivism seems to nicely capture our intuitions about the truth
of various knowledge ascriptions.
The contrastivist claims several other advantages for his view. Schaffer (2004a),
for example, suggests that contrastivism best explains the role of knowledge ascriptions.
After all, we utter knowledge ascriptions in contexts in which we want to indicate that a
subject can answer a certain question. And since the proposition known along with the
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contrast set exhaust the possible answers to the questions under consideration, knowledge
ascriptions with a contrastivist structure can fit this role of asserting that a subject knows
the answer to the question.
Next, it seems that contrastivism fits with a natural understanding of perceptual
knowledge (Schaffer 2004a). For it seems that perception is the ability to discriminate
one’s actual situation from some merely possible situation. And since perception
produces knowledge it seems that knowledge, too, involves an ability to discriminate
one’s actual situation from some merely possible situations and this is just what
contrastivism implies— that knowledge requires discriminating the actual or true
alternative from a set of possible alternatives.
Finally, Schaffer (2004a) claims that contrastivism provides us with an intuitive
picture of the progress through inquiry. So it seems plausible that at each stage of inquiry
we face a question with various contextually salient possible answers. A successful
inquiry involves figuring out which of the possible answers is the right one. So inquiry
produces knowledge and it seems that contrastivism can explain what this knowledge
amounts to.
Thus we have a lot of evidence that speaks in favor of contrastivism. Yet we may
wonder if there is any linguistic data to support the view— after all, the claim that
“knows” express a three-place relation seems counterintuitive. Certainly the surface-
grammar of knowledge ascriptions suggests that “knows” expresses a binary relation
between a subject and a proposition. In a recent paper, Schaffer (2008) claims that there
are linguistic data supporting the view. He considers the following case: Mary has stolen
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the bicycle. The detective at the crime scene finds Mary’s fingerprints at the location of
the theft. Schaffer suggests that, in this case, the following sentences are true:
(la) The detective knows who stole the bicycle.
(2a) The detective knows that Mary rather than Peter stole the bicycle.
(3a) The detective knows that it was Mary that stole the bicycle.
(4a) The detective knows that Mary stole the bicycle.
Yet he claims that the following sentences are false:
(lb) The detective knows what Mary stole.
(2b) The detective knows that Mary stole the bicycle rather than the wagon.
(3b) The detective knows that it was the bicycle that Mary stole.
(4b) The detective knows that Mary stole the bicycle.
Schaffer suggests that such data lend credence to the contrastivist’s position, for
sentences (la) through (4a) differ from sentences (lb) through (4b) only in their
embedded question (as in (la) and ( lb)), their ‘rather than’-clauses (in (2a) and (2b)),
their cleft construction (in (3a) and (3b)), or their stress (in (4a) and (4b)). But, according
to Schaffer, embedded questions, ‘rather-than’ clauses, cleft constructions, and stress all
function to set contrasts. So if the truth of knowledge ascriptions depends on these
linguistic mechanisms, it seems reasonable to conclude that the truth of knowledge
ascriptions depends, not only on which proposition is alleged to be known, but also the
set of contrast propositions that it is said to be discernable from.
So contrastivism does seem to enjoy some linguistic support and does seem to
provide an intuitive explanation of the apparent change in truth-value of various
knowledge ascriptions in different contexts. In the rest of the paper, I want to argue that
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there is another major advantage to being a contrastivist, namely that the view also seems
to fit nicely with our ordinary conception of evidence. Certainly knowledge and evidence
are related in an important way. After all, it seems we would not have any knowledge if
we did not have any evidence. But evidence seems to be question-relative— that is,
whether some proposition counts as evidence for another proposition depends on what
question is under consideration. But if this is true, then I think we have good reason for
thinking that knowledge is question-relative as well. Timothy Williamson (2000), in his
book. Knowledge and its Limits argues that all and only knowledge is evidence. I suggest
that such a view, if true, would, when combined with the claim that evidence is question-
relative, provide us with good reasons for thinking that knowledge is question-relative as
well. But I also claim that such a strong connection between knowledge and evidence is
not required in order to give us reason for thinking that the question-relativity of evidence
can provide evidence for the question-relativity of belief.
Williamson on Evidence
According to Williamson (2000), there are two necessary conditions fore’s being
evidence for hypothesis h for a subject S. First, it seems that e is evidence for h only if
the probability of h given e is greater than the probability of h alone. In other words, e
should raise the probability of h. Of course it also seems that e cannot be evidence for S
for h unless S has some reason to believe that e is true. So second, e is evidence for S for
h only if e has some kind of credible standing. If we accept these two criteria, we can
accept Williamson’s following schematic proposal (2000, 187):
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EV: e is evidence for h for S, iff S’s [body of] evidence includes e and the
probability of h conditional on e is greater than the unconditional probability
of h.
Williamson then goes on to suggest that an individual’s total body of evidence is simply
her total body of knowledge. Any individual piece of evidence then, must be some
individual piece of knowledge. In other words, in order for S to properly use rasa piece
of evidence for a given hypothesis, h, e must be included in S's total body of knowledge.
Williamson summarizes his view with the simple equation. Evidence = Knowledge, or E
= K, for short.
Accepting E = K has several noteworthy consequences. First, E = K commits us
to a kind of foundationalism; all of one’s knowledge serves as the foundation for all one’s
justified beliefs.24 Williamson suggests that this is a positive consequence of the view; it
allows us to avoid the potential regress of justification. Second, if we accept the doctrine
that one should proportion one’s belief to one’s evidence, given E = K, the idea becomes:
one should proportion one’s belief to the support it receives from one’s knowledge. Now
if we reject the KK principle— that we always know what we know— and we accept
Williamson’s equation, then we must also reject the “KE” principle— that we always
know what our evidence is. Williamson again suggests this is unproblematic, at least for
anyone who accepts (as they should) that only true propositions can be evidence.
After explaining away some potential problems with his view, Williamson goes
on to provide the following positive argument for his thesis (2000, 193):
24
Although, I am not sure if Williamson is therefore claiming that the foundational
knowledge need not be justified. It doesn’t seem that Williamson can hold this position
for he accepts that knowledge entails belief and the beliefs must be justified.
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1 . All evidence is propositional.
2. All propositional evidence is knowledge.
3. All knowledge is evidence.
4. Therefore, all and only knowledge is evidence.
To defend premise one, Williamson appeals to the theoretical functions evidence plays
and claims that such functions require that evidence be propositional. Williamson first
considers inference to the best explanation. He suggests that we choose between
hypotheses by determining which best explains our evidence— in other words, “evidence
is the kind of thing which hypotheses explain” (2000, 195). But the kind of thing
hypotheses explain is propositional; they provide why-explanations— they explain that. If
evidence is the kind of thing hypotheses explain, and the kind of thing hypotheses explain
is propositional, evidence must be propositional. Next Williamson considers
probabilistic reasoning and reaches a similar conclusion. The way to compare the
conditional probabilities of two hypotheses given a piece of evidence, e
,
is by
determining the inverse probabilities of e given each of the hypotheses. But what has a
probability is some proposition. Therefore, since evidence can have a probability,
evidence must be a proposition. Finally evidence sometimes rules out some hypotheses as
being inconsistent with it; but only propositions can be inconsistent in the relevant way.
So, evidence must be propositional. Here Williamson is satisfied with his positive
25
argument for the first premise.
25
Although, as far as I can tell, Williamson’s argument is inconclusive. Suppose
evidence is not propositional but, nevertheless, allowed a mapping into propositions so
that, for every distinct piece of evidence, there is a proposition p(e) that we have such
evidence. If this were the case, it seems that evidence could still play the roles that
Williamson examines, in virtue of the proposition p(e) playing the roles, without the
evidence itself being propositional.
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The second premise claims that nothing short of knowledge can be evidence. In
hopes of illustrating the plausibility of such a claim, Williamson provides an example of
a justified true belief that he feels does not constitute evidence (2000, 200-1 ). Consider
the case in which you are witnessing balls being drawn from a bag with replacement.
Each of the first n number of draws is red and you form the belief that draw u+1 will be
red. Though you do not have perfect justification for the belief, it seems that your belief
is justified in virtue of all of the prior draws being red. Your belief is true. Does it qualify
as evidence? Williamson argues that it does not. Since it seems natural to say that it is
consistent with your evidence that draw u+1 is black, the proposition that draw n+ 1 is red
cannot be part of your evidence. So, Williamson claims, your evidence does not include
the proposition that draw u+1 is red. We might conclude from his example that justified
true belief, or at least a true belief with an insufficient degree of justification, does not
constitute evidence. But presumably, if justified true belief is not evidence, then nothing
short of that could be. So it is reasonable to conclude that only knowledge can be
evidence."
6
In the third premise of the argument Williamson claims that a proposition’s being
known by S is the only restriction required for it to be evidence for S. Should there be
some other restriction on what counts as evidence? One might think that some standard of
certainty should be required for a proposition to count as evidence— for so much of our
26 One possible reply to Williamson’s claims here would be to begin invoking
probabilities of justification and degrees of evidence. So one might not, in this case, have
perfect justification for thinking that draw //+1 is red, but might have justification to
degree .v that draw n+l is red. Then the claim that draw n+l is red might not count as
evidence simpliciter for you, but might count as degree x of evidence for you. Williamson
does not discuss such a move and I will not pursue it here.
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knowledge is so easy to doubt. Williamson argues that any additional restriction would be
ad hoc. Further, any attempt at providing an additional restriction seems to face
problems. There seems to be no independently-motivated principle to determine which
propositions would then get to count as “certain enough” and which would not. Since no
restriction seems plausible, Williamson suggests we must accept that all knowledge is
evidence. With that he concludes that all and only knowledge is evidence.
In the final section of his chapter on evidence, Williamson considers whether all
epistemically justified belief is justified by evidence. Williamson claims that it is; for it is
hard to imagine how belief that is justified in the truth-directed sense could be justified
by anything but evidence. Williamson concludes that all epistemically justified beliefs
are justified by evidence. An epistemically justified belief that does not fall short of
knowledge itself becomes evidence by K = E. Williamson, then, accepts the following
two claims:
(A) All and only knowledge is evidence (K = E).
( B ) Only evidence justifies belief.
K=E and Epistemic Contrastivism
Williamson’s claim that all and only knowledge is evidence is controversial. But
in this section I want to consider the consequences of such a view for epistemic
contrastivism. In particular, I want to argue that such a view would support a contrastivist
27
The claim that belief justified in the truth-directed sense can only be justified by
evidence might, on some occasions, simply state a trivial truth— if evidence is taken to be
whatever it is that justifies belief in the truth-directed sense. But if we accept K = E, the
statement that only evidence justifies belief (in the truth-directed sense) is no longer
trivially true. In fact, it becomes rather controversial. For some might argue that if we
accept K = E, then seeming-evidence can justify belief in addition to evidence.
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picture of knowledge. For evidence certainly seems to be question-relative. That is,
whether some proposition counts as evidence for a person for some other proposition
depends on the question under consideration. But if evidence is question-relative, and
evidence is knowledge, then it seems likely that knowledge is question-relative as well—
that is, whether or not some proposition counts as known by a person depends on the
question under consideration. But to accept this is just to accept epistemic contrastivism.
To see that evidence is question-relative, we need only to look at some examples.
Consider the case mentioned above of Suzy at the crime scene. Suppose Suzy finds
Mustard’s fingerprints on the gun. Does Suzy have evidence for the proposition that
Mustard was in the library with the revolver? It seems that the answer here depends on
the question that is the subject of Suzy’s inquiry. If Suzy is inquiring into who was in the
library with the revolver, then that Mustard’s fingerprints were on the gun is evidence for
her for the proposition that Mustard was in the library with the revolver. But if, instead,
Suzy is inquiring into where the crime has taken place, then that Mustard’s fingerprints
on the gun is not evidence for Suzy that Mustard was in the library with the revolver. Or
consider a case of a scientist in a lab wondering what substance he is holding. Suppose
the scientist puts the substance in water and it dissolves. Is the dissolving of the substance
in water evidence that the substance was sodium? Again, it depends on the question
under consideration. If the live options include sodium (soluble in water) or indigo
(insoluble in water)— that is, if the question under consideration is, ‘sodium or indigo?’
Then the fact that the substance dissolved in water is evidence for the scientist for the
proposition that the substance was sodium. But if the live options are sodium or sugar
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(both water-soluble) then the fact that the substance dissolved in water is not evidence for
the scientist that the substance was sodium.
That evidence is question-relative also seems to be reflected by many of the
principles we accept regarding knowledge and the justification of belief. So, for example,
Duncan Pritchard claims that the following ‘underdetermination principle’ captures a
normal feature of our everyday epistemic practices:
(UP) For all S, \|/, cp, if S lacks adequate evidence which favors 9 over 9, and S
knows that \\
1
entails ~(p, then S does not know 9.
However, according to this principle, evidence is the kinds of thing that can favor one
hypothesis over a competing hypothesis. In other words, it seems that some proposition
only counts as evidence for one proposition when it counts as evidence against another.
That is, the relation of being evidence for , seems to be a contrastive relation—
a
proposition is evidence for some hypothesis only if supports that hypothesis rather than
another, contextually relevant, competing hypothesis.
These data, then, lend support to the claim that evidence is question-relative, that
is, they seem to indicate that whether some piece of information counts as evidence
depends on what question is under investigations. So if Williamson is right that all and
only knowledge is evidence, then it seems that knowledge too, is question-relative— that
is, whether some proposition counts as knowledge for a person depends on the question
under consideration.
Of course, Williamson’s claim that K=E is widely debated. But it seems to me
that we do not actually need the identification of knowledge and evidence in order to get
the contrastivist support I am alleging from considerations about evidence. For certainly
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knowledge and evidence are related in an important way. So if evidence is question-
relative, as it seems to be, this could be reason for thinking that knowledge is as well. In
Duncan Pritchard's paper, “Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism,” for example,
Pritchard (2008) argues against contrastivism on the grounds that it cannot offer a
plausible reply to the problem of radical skepticism. Further, Pritchard suggests that the
contrastivist is unable to offer a plausible understanding of evidence that allows us to
capture various features of our everyday epistemic practices, and therefore, the view
should be rejected. I argue that Pritchard is wrong about this, and in fact, that our
intuitions about the skeptical cases and the principles that guide our intuitions lend
support to a contrastivist picture of evidence and a contrastivist account of knowledge.
Pritchard on Contrastivism, Evidence, and Skepticism
Pritchard (2008, 306) begins by presenting the ‘standard,’ ‘closure-based’
skeptical argument. Where ‘E’ is some everyday proposition that we all take ourselves to
know, and ‘SH' is some skeptical hypothesis which is inconsistent with E, the argument
can be stated as follows.
(51) S does not know that not-SH.
(52) If S does not know that not-SH, then S does not know E.
(SC) Therefore, S does not know that E.
Pritchard (2008, 306-9) then goes on to discuss various possible replies to the
argument— both internalist replies and externalist replies. He claims that if we want to
accept closure, as he thinks we all should, then we all need to accept (S2). So the only
line open to doubt is (S 1 ). Thus, according to Pritchard (2008, 307-9), being an internalist
in the face of the above argument requires suspending our internalist requirements for
66
knowledge in the case of certain, “special” propositions. That is, the internalist must
allow certain beliefs (namely, not-SH beliefs) to have privileged epistemic status— she
must allow that we can know not-SH without the reflectively accessible grounds that we
are required to have in order for all of our other beliefs to be instances of knowledge. In
other words, the internalist, if she wants to avoid the consequences of the closure-based
skeptical argument, must hold that requirements for knowledge are waived in the case of
beliefs like not-SH. But, of course, Pritchard (2008, 308) claims that such a response to
the skeptical argument is ad hoc and therefore unattractive.
Pritchard also notes that we can understand the difficulties facing the internalist in
light of these skeptical considerations independently of this argument from closure. He
(2008, 310) suggests that considerations of the underdetermination principle, (UP) can
also pressure the internalist into making unattractive ad hoc claims about knowledge. He
notes that (UP) is motivated by the idea that knowing a proposition requires that one’s
evidence actually “favors” belief in that proposition over all of its known-to-be-
incompatible alternatives. Of course if we want to be internalists about knowledge— if we
want to hold on to the claim that knowledge requires reflectively accessible grounds for
belief in a proposition— then we need to understand this notion of ‘evidence’ in a
particular way— namely we need to interpret it along internalist lines. So one’s evidence
must be reflectively accessible too. On such an interpretation, knowing that /?, according
to UP, requires that one have reflectively accessible evidence that favors p over its
alternatives. But on such an interpretation, it seems difficult to hold that we ever meet
this constraint with respect to any everyday beliefs that we want to count as knowing. For
in order to know some everyday proposition, like that I have hands, I must have
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accessible evidence that favors this proposition over its skeptical alternatives because
these skeptical alternatives are certainly known to be incompatible with the everyday
beliefs. So, on the internalist picture, we are forced into the troubling skeptical
conclusions simply by appealing to (UP) and some seemingly uncontroversial principles.
Pritchard (2008, 312) concludes that being an internalist again seems to require us to hold
that certain beliefs are granted privileged epistemic status and are exempt from the
constraints of (UP).
Pritchard notes that the contrastivist is likely to be an internalist. And indeed,
Schaffer makes it clear that he is an internalist in his (2005). Schaffer (2005, 255) claims
that S knows that p rather than q iff:
1.
p,
2. S has proof that p rather than q,
3. S is certain that p rather than q on the basis of (2).
Schaffer’s second condition is his justification condition, which he calls ‘restricted
infall ibilism' about evidence. Proof, according to Schaffer, is conclusive evidence, where
evidence is defined in terms of elimination
:
possibility p is eliminated for S (at t) iff p is
inconsistent with S’s total experience e (at t). So on Schaffer’s view, S has proof that p
rather than q just in case q is eliminated for S.
Schaffer’s third condition on knowledge captures what he calls, his ‘restricted
indubitabilism’ about belief. According this condition, S's belief must be indubitable in
that S must be certain, or lack any doubt that p rather than q ifp is to count as knowledge
for S; further, S’s certainty in p must come from S’s proof that p rather than q. It is this
third condition that seems to capture Schaffer’s intemalism about knowledge (and
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evidence)— in order for some proposition,/?, to count as knowledge for S, S must have
reflective accessibility to his grounds for believing p rather than its contextually relevant
alternatives.
However, Pritchard claims (2008, 313) that this position is problematic because
the contrastivist of the internalist sort must reject (UP) as it is stated. For the contrastivist
holds that S can know that p even though S’s evidence does not favor p over all other
known-to-be-incompatible propositions. Rather, it is a crucial component of the
contrastivist’s picture that one may know that p if S’s evidence favors p over only the
contextually specified contrast propositions. Prichard (2008, 313) suggests that the
contrastivist’s rejection of (UP) amounts to a “rather fundamental form of epistemic
revisionism” and he claims this is a “major blow for the view” given that (UP) is such a
“central feature of our everyday conception of our epistemic terms.”
But this argument against contrastivism seems to beg-the-question. After all, the
contrastivist's rejection of (UP) is not some ad hoc move made only to avoid some
unfavorable consequences of the principle. Instead, the contrastivist’s rejection of (UP) is
motivated by independent considerations— namely considerations that seem to suggest
that (UP) as it is stated does not capture a central feature of our everyday conception of
knowledge or evidence. Instead, the contrastivist claims that our intuitions about the truth
of everyday knowledge claims should convince us that (UP) is false. In fact, it is our
intuitions about the truth of ordinary knowledge claims should convince us that we accept
a different, but related principle, (UP’):
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(UP') For all S, (p, \j/, if\\i is a contextually salient possibility and S lacks adequate
evidence which favors (p over \|/, and S knows that (p entails ~\|/, then S does not
know (p.
So the contrastivist will maintain that (UP’) is a central feature of our everyday
conception of knowledge, and that accepting it rather than (UP) does not amount to any
kind of epistemic revisionism, but instead allows us to capture the fact that ( lp) and (2p)
are true and (
1
p’) and (2p’) are false. Further it allows us to capture the fact that Moore
know that he has hands in everyday contexts despite the fact that he is unable to rule out
the possibility that he is not a brain-in-a-vat. Because (UP) does not allow us to explain
this data, it seems that accepting it amounts to a radical revision of our epistemic
concepts by forcing us to deny our very strong intuitions about knowledge in each of
these cases.
Pritchard (2008, 315), however, suggests that a rejection of (UP) is not
“consistent with the spirit of intemalism.” For it makes no sense for the internalist to
claim that one can have accessible evidence that genuinely supports one’s beliefs which
does not favor one’s beliefs over known to be incompatible alternatives. He illustrates
this complaint with an example. Imagine you are at a zoo staring at a zebra. According to
the internalist contrastivist, it should be possible for you to have evidence that favors the
belief that there is a zebra before you rather than a giraffe and, at the same time, fail to
have evidence that favors the belief that there is a zebra before you rather than a cleverly
disguised mule. On the contrastivist picture, as Pritchard understands it, this just amounts
to knowing that there is zebra rather than a giraffe, but failing to know that there is a
zebra rather than a disguised mule.
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But Pritchard (2008, 315) claims that the internalist picture cannot allow for a
case of this sort. For any evidence that you might have for the belief that it is a zebra
rather than a giraffe also seems to be evidence that it is a zebra rather than a disguised
mule. He imagines that your evidence for the former seems to be something like the
following: you can see what appears to be a zebra before you, you have good reason to
think your perceptual faculties are working reliably, and you have no reason for thinking
any defeaters are present. Pritchard (2008, 315) agrees that this evidence does seem to
favor the belief that there is a zebra rather than a giraffe, but he claims that it also is
evidence that seems to favor the belief that there is a zebra rather than a disguised mule.
So according to the contrastivist’s favored principle (UP’), you should know both that
there is a zebra rather than a giraffe and that there is a zebra rather than a disguised mule.
But this is a problem for the contrastivist because the contrastivist wants to hold that
there is only knowledge of the former and not the latter. But if we are going to grant
knowledge of the target proposition (that there is a zebra) relative to both contrasts, as
Prichard suggests we should, then there is no need to for contrastivism in these kinds of
cases. Pritchard (2008, 316) concludes that appealing to a difference in contrast sets is
unnecessary except in radically skeptical scenarios. Thus contrastivism is only motivated
by such radical cases and is not an essential feature of everyday knowledge. But if this is
true, then contrastivism as a general theory about knowledge lacks independent
motivation— it begins to look like an ad hoc solution to skeptical scenarios and does not
capture anything relevant about our ordinary concept of knowledge.
I think Pritchard is right that an internalist contrastivist of a certain sort will face
the difficulty he outlined above. That is, if an internalist contrastivist were to accept that
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evidence favoring the target proposition over the propositions in the relevant contrast set
guarantees knowledge of the target proposition, then it would be difficult to explain how
you can know that there is a zebra rather than a giraffe, but not that there is a zebra rather
than a disguised mule— after all your evidence seems to favor the target proposition over
its contrast proposition in both cases. But I do not think that this consideration is a
problem for most contrastivists, because I think that most contrastivists would be
reluctant to accept the principle that Pritchard is assuming about which conditions are
sufficient for knowledge. Pritchard seems to be suggesting that the contrastivist will be a
fallibilist about knowledge— that is, that the contrastivist will accept that mere favoring
evidence is evidence enough for knowledge. But I do not know of any contrastivists who
would accept such a view. It certainly seems that Schaffer would not accept that mere
favoring evidence is sufficient for knowledge because it does not capture the restrictive
infallibilist nature of his view. In order for S to know that p rather than q , Schaffer
requires not only that S’s evidence favors p rather than q , but also that S's evidence is
proof that p rather than q. Further, taking this restrictive infallibilist line allows Schaffer
to maintain that you, in the case described above, know that there is a zebra rather than a
giraffe but not that there is a zebra rather than a disguised mule. For presumably your
evidence includes that the animal you are looking at has stripes rather than spots and has
a short neck rather than a long one, and this evidence seems to be proof that the animal is
not a giraffe. So a contrastivist of this infallibilist sort is able to claim that contrastivism
can deliver the intuitive results in more ordinary cases, and so is an essential feature of
everyday knowledge. Further, a contrastivist of this sort can accept that (UP’) offers a
necessary condition for knowing that p rather than q. In fact, the idea that one must have
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evidence that (at least) favors p over its relevant alternatives, is the idea that drives the
contrastivist picture. So contrastivism is able to account for the relationship between
evidence and knowledge that is outlined in (UP’) and that we seem to think captures our
ordinary epistemic concepts.
Pritchard on Assertion and Claims to Know
Yet Pritchard (2008, 316-9) argues that the contrastivist’ s motivation for adopting
the contrastivist picture is based on a confusion regarding the conditions that are
necessary for knowledge and the conditions that are necessary for appropriately asserting
that one knows. Pritchard (2008, 316) notes that we typically convey our knowledge by
simply asserting a proposition. We rarely preface such an assertion with the phrase “I
know that.” He suggests that we tend to add this additional phrase only when we want to
signal an ability to resolve a challenge that has been raised. Prichard claims that such
practices reflect our conversational norms. By simply asserting some proposition, I
represent myself as having grounds that favor what is asserted and as being prepared to
offer such grounds. But by prefacing an assertion with the phrase “I know that,” I raise
the stakes— I represent myself as having grounds that conclusively discriminate between
what is asserted and other alternatives— namely error possibilities that were mentioned
by a challenger to my original assertion. Pritchard (2008, 317) again appeals to the person
at the zoo to illustrate his point. Suppose you are looking at a zebra and you say, "There's
a zebra.” On Pritchard’s view you represent yourself as knowing that it is a zebra— which
means, on his view, that you represent yourself as having evidence that favors that there
is a zebra over the known-to-be-incompatible alternatives. Now if you are challenged by
a bystander who wonders whether there is a gorilla rather than a zebra, it would be
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appropriate for you to assert, ‘'I know that there’s a zebra” because in doing so, you
represent yourself as having evidence that allows you to discriminate between the zebra
possibility and the error-possibility (the gorilla possibility). But If you are challenged by
a bystander who wonders whether there is a disguised mule rather than a zebra, it would
be inappropriate for you to assert, “I know that there’s a zebra” because you would be
representing yourself as having evidence that allows you to discriminate between a zebra
and a disguised mule— which presumably you do not have. So Pritchard (2008, 318)
argues that a discriminative ability is required in order to claim knowledge, but is not
required in order for you know. It is a failure to understand this difference that pushes the
contrastivist into adopting the contrastivist picture about knowledge possession (rather
than mere knowledge claiming).
Unfortunately Pritchard gives us little reason for thinking that the conditions
under which it is appropriate to claim knowledge are different from the conditions under
which one knows. He seems right that prefacing assertions with the phrase “I know that”
seems rather rare— but the contrastivist certainly has an explanation for why this is so—
for the contrastivist might hold, as Schaffer (2008b) does, that knowledge is the norm of
assertion. So in asserting some normal proposition, you represent yourself as knowing it.
Therefore, it is simply unnecessary to utter, “I know that" before the assertion— to do so,
on this view, would be redundant. For example, in asserting, "That is a zebra” (in a
context in which its being a zebra or a gorilla are the relevant possibilities) you represent
yourself as knowing that that is a zebra rather than a gorilla and so you do not need to add
the phrase “I know that” before the assertion.
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Pritchard suggests that we do add the phrase “I know that” when we are
challenged and an error-possibility is raised. But this strikes me as an inaccurate
representation of the way in which a dialogue would occur. If a bystander overhears you
at the zoo utter, “That is a zebra,” and challenges you by raising the possibility that it is a
gorilla, it would strike me as odd if you were to simply respond to his challenge, “I know
that that is a zebra.” Rather, it seems to me that a more appropriate response would be for
you to indicate the evidence you have for thinking that it is a zebra rather than a gorilla.
But this sort of response would, I think, lend support to the contrastivist position that
knowledge that p rather than q requires proof that p rather than q and that knowledge is
the norm of assertion. For in asserting that that is a zebra, you automatically represent
yourself as knowing that it is a zebra rather than a gorilla. In challenging you, it seems
the bystander is challenging your implicature that you know that it is a zebra rather than a
gorilla and is asking for your evidence— asking, that is, why you take yourself to know
what you represent yourself as knowing. In responding to the challenge by outlining your
evidence, you are explaining precisely why you take yourself to know what you represent
yourself as knowing. So all of the data that Pritchard sites can be captured by the
contrastivist.
Further, it seems that Pritchard's claim that the conditions under which we know
are not sufficient for appropriately claiming to know is highly unintuitive. For such a
view entails that there are going to be number of propositions that we know, that we can
appropriately assert, but which we cannot appropriately claim to know. For example, in
the case above, you know that there is a zebra, you can appropriately assert that there is a
zebra, but you cannot appropriately assert that you know that there is a zebra. This strikes
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me as incredibly odd. Additionally, it is not clear what the view implies about attributing
knowledge to others, or in asserting that someone else knows. Presumably the conditions
under which each person knows p are going to be the same for all— knowing requires
(perhaps among other things) that one’s evidence favors the target proposition. But are
we able to appropriately assert that someone else knows something when their evidence
favors the target proposition? Or must their evidence allow them to conclusively
distinguish between the target proposition and the relevant error-possibilities? If the
former, then we have the unintuitive result that your friend may say of you at the zoo that
you know that there is a zebra rather than a disguised mule in front of you, but you are
unable to agree with her. If the latter— if appropriately attributing knowledge to others
requires a distinguishing ability then we will very rarely be able to attribute knowledge to
anyone— even when they do know. So it seems that Pritchard’s view about appropriate
knowledge ascriptions applies only to self-knowledge ascriptions. But it is unclear what
is special about self-knowledge ascriptions that make them more difficult to appropriately
assert than other-directed knowledge ascriptions. If anything, I would have thought that
the degree of difficulty went in the other direction— it seems that it may be easier to
appropriately ascribe knowledge to yourself than to someone else.
Finally, it is not clear to me that Pritchard’s claims about appropriate self-
knowledge ascriptions are consistent with his other views. Pritchard claims to be an
externalist about knowledge— on his view, at least as presented in this paper, to know is
to have evidence (externally construed) that favors the target proposition over known-to-
be-inconsistent alternatives. Because he is an externalist about evidence, Prichard claims
that one need not know what one’s evidence is; knowledge on his view does not require
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reflective accessibility to one’s evidence. This is why Pritchard can hold that a brain-in-a-
vat with experiences just like yours fails to have evidence that he has hands, even though
you do have evidence that you have hands (given that the world is largely as you think it
is). And this is why you know that you have hands while the brain-in-a-vat does not.
But although Pritchard is an externalist about knowledge, he seems to be an
internalist of sorts about norms of assertion. He (2008, 317) claims that one often
conveys one’s knowledge of a proposition simply by asserting it, and “it is a general rule
of assertion that in making an assertion one is representing oneself as being in a position
to offer grounds to back-up what is asserted, and that must mean that the grounds in
question are reflectively accessible to one.” As noted earlier, Prichard also claims that
preceding an assertion with the phrase “I know that” raises the stakes. In doing so one is
representing oneself as being in a position to offer grounds which discriminate between
what was asserted and the relevant error-possibilities— so again, these grounds must be
reflectively accessible to one. But these three views together seem to paint an unintuitive
picture of what we know and what we may appropriately assert. Pritchard emphasizes the
need to differentiate between the conditions under which it is appropriate to claim
knowledge and the conditions under which one knows. But there seems to be a third
element here— namely the conditions under which it is appropriate to assert some known
proposition. To know that p on Pritchard's view, one needs (externally construed)
evidence that favors p over all known-to-be-incompatible alternatives; this evidence need
not be reflectively available to one. But to appropriately assert that p , one needs
reflectively accessible evidence that p over all known-to-be-incompatible alternatives.
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And to appropriately assert that one knows that p, one needs reflectively accessible
evidence for conclusively distinguishing p from relevant error possibilities.
Consider Pritchard's example discussed above. You are at the zoo and see a
zebra. On Pritchard's view, you know that it is a zebra even though you are unable to rule
out that it is a vat-image of a zebra because you have externally construed evidence that
favors the proposition that it is a zebra. Yet it seems that on Pritchard’s view you cannot
appropriately assert “That is a zebra” because you do not have accessible evidence that it
is a zebra rather than a vat-image of a zebra. But if you do assert it, and you are
challenged by a bystander who wonders if the animal is a gorilla, you can appropriately
assert, “I know that it’s a zebra” because you can distinguish between the target
proposition (that it is a zebra) and the now-relevant error-possibility (that it is a gorilla).
All of this seems highly unintuitive.
Now it is possible that the view outlined above is not, in fact, Pritchard’s. As
noted, Pritchard claims that in asserting some proposition one represents oneself as
knowing that proposition. So Pritchard might claim that all that is required for
appropriately asserting a proposition is that one knows it— which on his view means that
one only needs cognitively-inaccessible favoring evidence for the proposition. Perhaps,
then, when Pritchard mentioned the “general rule of assertion” mentioned above, it was
not a rule that he would endorse.
Yet, it seems that such a rule does in fact govern our asserting practices. We can
see this if we consider what counts as an appropriate "move” in a conversation. It seems
that when one asserts some proposition, one opens oneself up to challenges of the sort
that Pritchard mentions. That is, in making an assertion, we open ourselves up to “how do
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you know?” questions (Schaffer 2008). And if one challenges your assertion with such a
question, and you are unable to answer the question satisfactorily— that is, if you are
unable to offer your grounds for knowing— then we think that you should withdraw your
assertion. In other words, we will think that your original assertion was unlicensed or
inappropriate. This is evidence then, that asserting that p does signal that one has
cognitively assessable grounds for believing that p.
Of course, the contrastivist can account for all this data by maintaining that the
conditions under which one knows are also the conditions under which one is licensed to
assert and are also the conditions under which one is licensed to assert that one knows.
One knows that p rather than q only if one has evidence that proves that p rather than q ,
and that one has access to such evidence, and is certain that p rather than q on the basis of
such evidence. One is licensed to assert that p , in a context in which p and q exhaust the
relevant possibilities if and only if one knows that p rather than q. And one is licensed to
assert that one knows that p in such a context only if one knows that one know that p
rather than q —so the rules governing assertions of self-knowledge are the same as those
governing the assertion of any other proposition. So with respect to the case of you at the
zoo, you know that there is a zebra rather than a giraffe or a gorilla just in case there is a
zebra, your evidence conclusively rules out that there is a giraffe or a gorilla, and you are
certain on the basis of such evidence that there is a zebra rather than a giraffe or a gorilla.
If you are talking to your child who is wondering which of the three animals it is, you
may appropriately assert that it is a zebra. If challenged by a bystander who wonders
whether it is a gorilla, you could appropriately assert that you know that it is a zebra and
you would be expected to offer the evidence for your belief. Now if challenged by a
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bystander who wonders whether it a disguised mule, you are not licensed to assert that it
is a zebra or that you know that it is a zebra, because in raising this possibility, the
bystander has changed the contrast set. And (despite what Pritchard claims) you do not
know that it is a zebra rather than a disguised mule (even though your evidence favors
that it is a zebra, your evidence does not conclusively rule out that it is a disguised mule).
So the internalist, restricted infallibilist, contrastivist can offer a cohesive and intuitive
picture of all of the data.
Conclusion
Epistemic contrastivism is an attractive view for several reasons. One primary
reason for being a contrastivist is that it seems to provide a simple solution to the
skeptical dilemma— the contrastivist is able to explain how it is that we know many
propositions in ordinary contexts, but fail to know many propositions in the skeptical
contexts. Additionally, contrastivism seems to enjoy a fair amount of support from the
linguistic data— there are a number of linguistic mechanisms that record a contrast set
and using one of these linguistic mechanism seems to have an effect on the truth-value of
the relevant knowledge ascription. Therefore, there seems to be reason to believe that the
truth of such knowledge ascriptions depends on the contrast set encoded. In this paper I
have argued that consideration about the nature of evidence also seem to lend support to
the contrastivist picture. Whether some proposition counts as evidence for another some
hypothesis depends on the alternative hypotheses under consideration— or depends on the
question being asked at the current stage of inquiry. If Williamson is right that all
evidence is knowledge, then it seems likely that whether that proposition counts as
knowledge should also depend on the relevant contrast set. But even if Williamson is
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wrong, and it is not the case that K=E, the close connection between knowledge and
evidence, as outlined in Pritchard’s paper, is good reason for thinking that knowledge
may be question-relative, or sensitive to contrasts, if evidence is. And this, of course, is
just what the contrastivist claims
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CHAPTER 4
QUESTIONS AND THE COMPLEMENT-EMBEDDING BEHAVIOR OF THE
ATTITUDE VERBS
One notable feature of the various attitude verbs is that they differ with respect to
the kind of complements that they can embed. So, for example, in English, believe unlike
know can take only declarative complements. And interestingly, wonder
,
unlike believe
and know takes only interrogative complements. This phenomenon does not seem to be a
mere lexical accident because the patterns appear stable across language (Karttunen 1977,
Ginzburg 1995, Lahiri 2002). We may wonder then, if there is some fact about the nature
of the attitudes that determines the verb’s complement selection. For example, the
contrast between believe and know may lend support to the idea that believe-/V;<7r
ascriptions and knowledge-r/zczr ascriptions have different logical forms despite their
similar surface grammar. Similarly, the contrast between wonder and know may support
the claim that knowledge-w/i ascriptions and wonder-wh ascriptions have different logical
forms despite their similar surface grammar.
Hintikka (1975) has suggested that the embedding behavior of attitude verbs is
correlated with the factivity of the attitude verb— he hypothesized that those verbs that
are factive can take both declarative and interrogative complements. Paul Egre (2008, 86)
notes that in order to evaluate this claim, we must distinguish between two notions of
factivity. On one account of factivity, a predicate is factive if it entails the truth of its
complement; Egre calls verbs that have this feature, “veridical.” On another
understanding, a verb is factive if it presupposes the truth of its complement. Egre
continues to call verbs with this feature “factive.” He notes that some verbs, like tell and
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decide which seem non-veridical allow both declarative and interrogative complements.
For example, given that (1) and (2) are acceptable, it seems that tell-ascriptions and
decide-ascriptions can be true even when the proposition denoted by their that-
complement is false:
( 1 ) Alex told us that John was at the party, but, in fact, John was not there.
(2) In December Alex decided that his next trip would be to Hawaii, but he ended
up going to Fiji instead.
So Egre notes that veridicality does not seem to be necessary for a verb to take both kinds
of complements. Further, some verbs like regret
,
which are generally considered factive
and veridical do not take interrogative complements. So it seems factivity is not sufficient
for a verb to admit both kinds of complements. In his paper, Egre evaluates the
hypothesis that all and only veridical attitude verbs that take ///^/-complements also take
w/z-complements. He first argues that all veridical verbs can admit both kinds of
complements, but he acknowledges that the converse may not hold— for it appears that
there are some verbs that take both interrogative complements and declarative
complements that are not veridical. Nevertheless, Egre maintains that these apparent
exceptions to the principle can be explained away and ultimately he concludes that a
biconditional form of the hypothesis is defensible. In the later sections of his paper, Egre
attempts to explain why the attitude verbs pattern themselves in this way.
In this chapter I evaluate Egre’s hypothesis and his explanations for the
embedding behavior of the various attitude verbs. That is, I attempt to determine the
extent to which the factivity or veridicality of a verb is correlated with its embedding
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behavior and I attempt to explain why factivity or veridicality plays such an important
role.
Egre on Factivity, Veridicality, and Complements
Egre (2008, 87) notes at the outset of his paper that he is concerned with the
connection between a verb’s taking //////-complements and that verb’s taking whether-
complements in particular. He notes that some verbs, like surprise , which seem to admit
other w’/z-complements fail to admit whether-complements. For the purposes of this
paper, Egre considers these verbs to be non-question embedding verbs. Thus the question
that Egre considers is the following: to what extent can veridicality be seen as necessary
and sufficient for a verb that takes //////-complements to also take w7/c///cr-complements?
Egre first argues that all veridical attitude verbs are able to embed whether-
complements. Remember that on Egre’s view (2008, 101), a verb that takes that-clauses
is veridical if it entails the truth of its complement when used in the positive declarative
form, that is, if it satisfies the schema V that-p -> p for all p, where p is a declarative
sentence. Egre emphasizes that this notion of veridicality is to be distinguished from
another notion, which he calls factivity. According to Egre, a verb is factive if an
assertion of the form “x Vs that-p” and of the form “x does not V that-p" presupposes the
truth of the complement p. On this picture, know is both factive and veridical. For (3):
(3) Ann knows that it is raining
entails that it is raining. Further, an utterance of (3) presupposes that it is raining, as does
an utterance of (4):
(4) Ann does not know that it is raining.
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It seems that some verbs are veridical and yet not factive. For example, (5) seems to
entail that it is raining:
(5) Ann has proven that it is raining.
Yet (6) does not seem to presuppose that it is raining:
(6) Ann has not proven that it is raining.
So prove seems to be veridical but not factive. It is less clear that a verb can be factive
and not veridical. Yet some scholars, including Egre (2008, 102-5) claim that some
factive, non-veridical verbs exist. For example, it seems that (7) presupposes that Ann
spilled the milk, even though (8) does not entail that she did:
(7) Ann does not regret that she spilled the milk.
(8) Ann regrets that she spilled the milk.
To see that (8) does not entail the truth of the complement, imagine that Ann did not in
fact spill the milk, but only falsely believes that she did. It seems that in such a case, (8)
could still be true, even though the complement of (8) denotes a false proposition. Thus
Egre (2008, 105) concludes that regret is not veridical and hence that not all factive verbs
are veridical. We see then, that Egre is not committed to the claim that Hintikka seems to
endorse that all factive verbs can take both declarative and whether-comp\ements.
Instead, he accepts that all veridical verbs can take both kinds of complements. He
spends the rest of his paper attempting to explain why this is so.
Egre on the Meaning of Whether and Complement-embedding Behavior
Egre (2008, 107) begins his explanation of this apparent connection between
veridicality and the taking of whether-complements by examining the meaning of
w/z^r/j^r-complements in general. He notes that it is possible that whether-clauses may
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have different meanings in different contexts— in particular, there seems to be some
evidence that whether-complements after wonder have a different meaning than whether-
complements after verbs like know. Nevertheless, Egre claims that he will treat whether-
clauses as having a uniform meaning. He follows Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982, 1990)
in assuming that the extension of a question is its true answer. So the extension of
“whether/?” is the proposition p ifp is true and the proposition not p ifp is false. Further,
Egre accepts, as Groenendijk and Stokhof do, that a whether-clause denotes its extension
after verbs like know. So after know
,
“whether /?” denotes the proposition p ifp is true
and denotes the proposition not-p if p is false. But, they claim, after verbs like wonder ,
“whether /?” does not denote its extension (its true answer) but rather, denotes its
intension— namely the function from the context to the true propositional answer to the
question in that context. In this way, Egre claims that whether-clauses get treated as
having a uniform meaning in every context in which they appear— that is, no matter
which verb the whether-clause follows. There is a difference in denotation, but according
to Egre (2008, 108), “the difference between “whether/?” after wonder and after know is
fundamentally a type distinction, which leaves the meaning of the embedded question
essentially invariant.”
Given this view about the meaning of whether-clauses and about the denotation of
whether-clauses after verbs like know, Egre (2008, 108) accepts the following principle
about the truth of attitude ascriptions involving “whether”:
Meaning of whether
:
for a verb V that takes that-clauses [and
whether-clauses], “x V whether /?” is true in / iff the referent of x is
in the relation denoted by V to the true answer to the question “?p”
in /.
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So, suppose it is raining. According to the meaning of whether principle, (9) is true just in
case Ann stands in the knowledge relation to the proposition that it is raining:
(9) Ann knows whether it is raining
Egre claims that other facts about ve/zcr/zcr-ascriptions can help us understand the nature
of vv/zc/7/cr-complements. In particular, Egre notes that using a whether-c\a.\ise, in an
attitude ascription rather than a that-clause “weakens” the claim being made. So for
example, an utterance of (10) seems stronger or more informative than an utterance of
( 11 ):
( 10) Paul knows that Peter is coming to dinner.
(11) Paul knows whether Peter is coming to dinner.
(10) seems more informative because (10) specifies which proposition it is that Peter
knows, while (11) seems to tell us something less, something like Peter knows the
proposition that is the answer to the question, “Is Peter coming to dinner?” And it seems
that (1 1) follows from (10)— that is, it seems that (1 1) must be true if (10) is. And this
seems to be the case for all verbs that are able to take both interrogative and declarative
complements— whenever one Vs that p , one Vs whether p. So Egre (2008, 108) claims
that all verbs that take both that- and vW/er/z^r-complements satisfy the entailment from
“
that-p” to “whether-p”
.
He states the “that-to-whether” constraint as the second
assumption of his view.
That-to-whether constraint: a verb V that takes declarative
complements takes vv/z^f/zcr-complements provided it satisfies [or
would satisfy] the entailment from “jc V that p” to “.* V whether p .”
Egre suggests that this principle can serve as a criterion for determining whether some
verb that takes that-complements will also take ve/z^r/zcr-complements. Of course, it
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seems likely that all veridical verbs satisfy the thcit-to-whether constraint if whether-
clauses denote the true answer to the question “?p” after such verbs. For if the verb is
veridical, and “jc Vs that p” is true, then p must be true; and ifp is true, then “whether p"
will denote the proposition that p. So an attitude ascription with either a declarative or
whether-complement will express the proposition that the subject stands in the V relation
to the true proposition that p.
Yet Egre (2008, 109) points out two predicates that seem to pose a problem for
the that-to-whether constraint: he true, and be right. Both are veridical but neither takes
vv’/jef/icr-complements. Their failure to take whether-complements seems difficult to
explain— if whether-complements simply denote their true answers, then it would seem
that “jc is right that p" would entail “a is right whether p." Egre (2008, 109-10) has two
responses to these seemingly problematic verbs. First, he notes that they are not really
attitude verbs. He follows Abusch (2002) in holding that “x is right that p" presupposes
that jc believes p , but does not assert that a believes p in the way that “a
- knows that p"
does. Since there is no attitudinal “component” to being right that or being true that, if we
are only concerned with an account of the attitude verbs, we need not concern ourselves
with these apparent exceptions to Egre's principle. Second, Egre argues that a sentence of
the form “a is right whether p" or “it is true whether p" would assert something vacuous,
unlike other ascriptions with a whether-complement, like he clear-whether ascriptions.
So according to Egre, (2008, 1 10) ( 12) asserts that the true answer to the question “Is the
budget sufficient?” will be clear at the end of the semester:
(12) By the end of the semester, it will be clear whether the budget was
sufficient.
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But (12*), if it were acceptable, would assert that the true answer to the question “Is the
budget sufficient?” is true:
(12*) It will be true whether the budget was sufficient.
But such an assertion would be vacuous. So Egre (2008, 1 10) claims that we should not
be surprised that these verbs do not license whether-complements. Hence he (2008, 1 10)
suggests we might want to modify the that-to-whether constraint in the following way:
That-to-whether constraint’: a verb V that takes declarative
complements takes whether-complements provided it satisfies [or
would satisfy] the entailment from “jc V that p" to “x V whether p"
and provided that the [V-whether ascription] is non-vacuous
.
Since be right that and be true that do not satisfy this constraint, we
should not expect that they take w7z^/zer-complements.
Here, Egre (2008, 1 1 1) is satisfied that his view can explain why all veridical
attitude verbs take whether-complements. Yet he (2008, 111) claims that in order for the
that-to-whether constraint to be fully explanatory, it must be that no non-veridical verbs
that take ^/-complements also take vv/z^r/zcr-complements. And indeed, Egre points out
that most non-veridical verbs cannot satisfy the that-to-whether constraint. Believe for
example, cannot satisfy the constraint because a person may believe that p even ifp is
false. But if “whether p" denotes the true answer to the question “?p,” then a believe-
whether ascriptions could only be true if what the person believed was true. So believe
cannot admit u7z^/zer-complements, because it does not satisfy the that-to-whether
constraint.
But Egre (2008, 1 12) notes that at least some verbs seem to pose a problem for his
account— te//, and guess, for example both appear to be non-veridical, yet both verbs
seem to admit that- and w/z^Z/z^r-complements. Egre (2008, 1 13-6) again considers
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several possible replies to these apparently problematic verbs. First he notes that tell and
guess
,
while non-veridical with respect to f/mf-complements, often have a veridical
reading when they take wh-complements. Unfortunately, Egre has only given us a
definition of veridicality that applies when a verb takes a f/zar-complement. Remember,
that a verb, V is veridical with respect to Vclauses on Egre’s view, just in case, V that-p
-> p for all p. But this definition cannot be adapted to w/zcr/zcr-complements
straightforwardly. For we cannot say that a verb, V is veridical, with respect to whether-
clauses just in case, V whether-p -> p for all p. To see why consider the following
sentence:
( 1 3) Ann knows whether it is raining.
Certainly Egre wants to claim that know is veridical with respect to both that- and
whether- complements. But (13) does not entail that it is raining.
So Egre is understanding veridicality differently when the verb has a whether-
complement. Presumably a verb, V, is veridical with respect to whether-complement just
in case a sentence
il
x Vs whether-/;” is true if and only if .v Vs the right answer to the
question “?p.” On this understanding of veridicality, Egre (2008, 1 14) suggests that tell-
that ascriptions are not veridical, but tell-whether ascriptions are. So on his view, ( 14)
does not entail that it is raining:
(14) Ann told us that it is raining.
while (15) seems that it can be true only if Ann told us the true answer to the question, “Is
it raining?”
(15) Ann told us whether it is raining.
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Similarly, consider the following scenario: suppose Ben says to us, “Carl is the only one
coming to the party.” But in fact, Carl is not coming to the party. Egre suggests that in
this scenario, (16) is true, but ( 1 7) is false:
(16) Ben told us that Carl is coming to the party.
( 17) Ben told us who is coming to the party.
And Egre claims that we see something similar go on in the case of guess. Guess is not
veridical when it takes a f/wf-complement but is generally taken to be veridical when it
takes an interrogative complement. So suppose that Dana is the only person coming to
the party. Suppose Evan is unsure about who is coming and guesses that Fred is coming
to the party. Egre suggests that in this case, (18) is true, but (19) and (20) are false:
( 1 8) Evan guessed that Dana is coming to the party.
(19) Evan guessed who is coming to the party.
(20) Evan guessed whether Dana is coming to the party.
Yet the claim that guess and tell are veridical when they take interrogative complements
is a controversial one, as Egre himself notes. He points out that there do seem to be
perfectly acceptable sentences that suggest that these verbs are non-veridical, even with
whether-complements. Egre (2008, 1 14-5) mentions the following examples:
(21 ) Everyday the meteorologists tell the population whether it will rain the
next day, but they are often wrong.
(22) For each draw, I had to guess whether an odd number or an even number
would come out. All my guesses proved to be wrong.
Egre admits that tell and guess are problematic for his view, given that they do seem to be
non-veridical, at least when they take /V/rtf-complements. He (2008, 1 15) mentions that
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there may be alternative interpretations of such sentences. For example, Lewis (1982)
claims that telling falsely whether may not actually count as telling whether at all, but
only as purporting to tell whether. Similarly we may think that incorrectly guessing
whether is not really guessing whether
,
but rather attempting to guess whether.
Nevertheless, Egre (2008, 1 16) is hesitant to adopt these interpretations and instead holds
that tell-tliat, and presumably guess-that, are ambiguous between a veridical and a non-
veridical interpretation. Further, he notes (2008, 1 16) that he is “in principle committed to
the view that questions after tell [and guess] primarily have the veridical reading." Thus
despite these two apparent counterexamples, Egre maintains that all and only veridical
verbs can take w7?ct/icr-complements, and he believes that his that-to-whether constraint
explains why this pattern holds.
Problems for Egre
Egre’s view about the meaning of whether-c\imses does initially seem to fit nicely
with the complement-embedding behavior of various attitude verbs. If whether-clauses
simply denoted their true answer, then we would expect that the veridical verbs would be
the verbs to take both kinds of complements. Nevertheless, his view seems to face several
problems. First, his claim that an embedded question denotes its true answer seems to
commit us to an unintuitive account of what gets expressed by attitude ascriptions with
embedded questions. So suppose that it is raining. On Egre's picture, (23) and (24)
express the very same proposition:
(23) Ann knows that it is raining.
(24) Ann knows whether it is raining.
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But this does not seem right. For (23) and (24) seem to express different propositions and
provide the audience with different information. That is, (23) seems to inform the
audience both that it is raining and that Ann knows the answer to the question “Is it
raining?” But (24), on the other hand, seems only to inform the reader that Ann knows
the answer to the question, “Is it raining?” The audience is not given any information
about whether it is raining or not. That is, (23) tells us what the answer to the question is,
while (24) does not.
To see this in another way, consider a case in which Bob has been stuck indoors
all day with no access to a weather report. Nevertheless, Bob knows that Ann has just
come in from outside. In this case. Bob may believe (24) without believing (23). And in
such a context. Bob could assert (24) truly and appropriately, but would not be in a
position to assert (23). But Egre’s view cannot explain this data. On his view, (23) and
(24) simply say the very same thing— they contain the very same information. So if
someone was in a position to believe or know or assert one of them, he must also be in a
position to believe or know or assert the other.
Interestingly, Egre’s intuitions seem to match up with those reported here, hence
it appears that his view does a disservice to his own intuitions. In explaining his that-to-
whether constraint, he notes that using a whether-c\ause in attitude ascription rather than
a that-c\ause “weakens” the claim being made. So, as mentioned earlier, an utterance of
(10) seems stronger or more informative than an utterance of ( 1 1 ):
(10) Paul knows that Peter is coming to dinner.
(11) Paul knows whether Peter is coming to dinner.
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But since the that-clause and the xvhether-c\a\\SQ in ( 10) and (11) denote the same
entity— namely the proposition that Peter is coming to dinner, Egre has no natural
explanation of the difference in “strength” of ( 10) and (11).
Second, it is not clear that Egre’s view of the meaning of xvhether-clauses really
can give us a uniform account of the role of whether-clauses following each of the
attitude verbs. He claims that xxhether-ciauses after wonder denote their intensions, while
whether-clauses after most other attitude verbs denote their extensions. But positing such
a change in denotation does not seem motivated. After all, on Egre’s view, wondering
whether p and knowing whether p involve standing in some relation to different things—
when one wonders one stands in a relation to a function but when one knows, one stands
in the relation to a question. Now Egre may be right that any plausible theory of the
meaning of whether-clauses will require us to recognize a difference in denotation, or a
type-shifting of this sort, yet we may think that a theory that offers a uniform treatment of
whether-clauses has a prima facie advantage.
Finally, it is not clear why, on Egre's view of questions and attitude ascriptions, a
he right-whether or be true-whether ascription would come out vacuous as he claims. For
such ascriptions would, on his view, assert the same proposition as be right-that or be
true-that ascriptions, but Egre does not seem to think that these ascriptions (with
declarative complements) are vacuous. He writes (2008, I 10) that “sentences like... ‘it is
28 To make sense of this, Egre may distinguish the proposition expressed (the same in
both (8) and (9)) from the information conveyed (greater in (8)). He might in principle
allow that the means of expression of the proposition (its guise) could play a
communicative role. (Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer here.) However, it seems that this
response could not explain why belief ascriptions involving (8) and (9) can have different
truth-values (as in the case of Bob, for example).
94
true whether it is raining’ would assert that the true answer to the question is true... being
a vacuous statement.” But presumably, sentences like, “it is true that it is raining” are not
vacuous. And “it is true whether it is raining” would not, on Egre’s view, express the
proposition that the true answer to the question, “is it raining?” is true; instead it would
express the proposition that it is true that it is raining. But it is not clear why a sentence
expressing this later proposition would be vacuous. After all, we say things like this all
the time, and such statements are sometimes informative.
An Alternative Understanding of the Meaning of Whether-clauses
Egre’s understanding of embedded questions plays a crucial role in his
explanation of the embedding behavior of various verbs. On his account, a verb’s
satisfying the that-to-whether constraint will explain why that verb takes both that- and
whether-complements. Further, his view can explain why veridical verbs nearly always
satisfy the that-to-whether constraint: because the whether-clause simply denotes the true
answer to the question— the same proposition denoted by the that-clause of a true attitude
ascription with a //////-complement. And the view can explain why most non-veridical
verbs fail to satisfy the that-to-whether constraint: because attitude ascriptions with a
//////-complement involving non-veridical verbs can be true, even if the proposition
denoted by the //////-clause is false. But on Egre’s view, the whether-clause of an attitude
ascription with a w/zc^/cr-complement would still denote only the true answer to the
question. So the proposition denoted by the //////-clause of such attitude ascriptions will
not necessarily be the same as the proposition denoted by the whether-clause of such
attitude ascriptions. Since Egre’s view about the meaning of whether-clauses plays such
an integral role in his explanation of complement-embedding behavior of the attitude
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verbs, vve may wonder whether any other understanding of whether-clauses can offer a
rival explanation.
I have argued previously that questions are sets of possibilities— namely the
possible answers to the question. Embedded questions, then, do not denote their true
answer, but rather denote the set of possible answers. Further, on my view, attitude
ascriptions of the form “jc Vs whether p" express that x stands in the V relation to the
question “?p.” In this section of the paper I will argue first, that this understanding of
embedded questions avoids the problems that Egre's view of embedded questions faces
and second, that such an understanding of questions can offer an explanation of the
complement-embedding behavior that enjoys all of the benefits that Egre’s view did.
For starters, this understanding of questions offers a much more intuitive account
of the proposition expressed by attitude-whether ascriptions. On this account, an attitude-
whether ascription of the form “a- Vs whether/?” expresses the proposition that X stands
in the relation denoted by “V” to the question denoted by “whether /?.” And indeed, this
seems to capture the intuitive content of such ascriptions. So for example, on this view,
an utterance of (9) expresses that Ann stands in the knowledge relation to the question,
“Is it raining?”
(9) Ann knows whether it is raining
And (9) is true, that is, Ann stands in the knowledge relation to the question, “Is it
raining?” if Ann knows what the answer to the question, “Is it raining?” is. On this
account, then, (23) and (24) come out as expressing different propositions. (23) says that
Ann knows the proposition that it is raining. And (24) says that Ann stands in the
knowledge relation to the question, “Is it raining?” On this account, then. Bob can
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reasonably believe (24) but fail to believe (23)— if Bob knows that Ann is able to answer
a particular question, but does not know himself what the answer to that question is.
Second, as noted earlier, this understanding of embedded questions does allow us
to offer a uniform account of weather-complements. That is, this view implies that a
whether-clause denotes the same thing, regardless of which verb it follows. So wondering
whether p and knowing whether p involve standing in a different relation to the very same
entity. Similarly, the view can offer a uniform treatment of ask and investigate which,
like wonder
,
take only interrogative complements. I take it that this is a positive feature
of the view, because wonder
,
ask
,
and investigate ascriptions share a common surface
form with all other attitude ascriptions with an interrogative complement. This similar
surface form by no means entails that they have similar logical forms, but it seems to be
good evidence that they do. And absent any evidence that their logical forms should
differ, that the account can offer a uniform treatment of all of these attitude ascriptions
seems to speak in favor of it.
Whether-c\auses and Complement-embedding Behavior
So the proposed understanding of the meaning of whether-c lauses seems to avoid
the problems that plagued Egre’s account of whether-clauses, and thus seems preferable
on its own merits. Of course we may still wonder whether the current account can explain
the complement-embedding behavior of the attitude verbs. According to Egre, explaining
the complement-embedding behavior of the attitude verbs primarily requires an
explanation of why nearly all veridical verbs that can take r/mr-complements can also
take interrogative complements and nearly all non-veridical verbs that can take that-
complements cannot take interrogative complements. Further, it seems that we want to
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explain why some non-veridical verbs (like wonder and ask) cannot take that-
complements but can take interrogative complements. In the remainder of this paper I
will attempt to determine the extent to which the proposed understanding of questions
can help us to explain the embedding patterns of all types of verbs.
Let us begin by considering verbs that take only //////-complements. This list
includes believe, pretend, claim, desire, hope,fear, wish, say, admit, think, suspect,
persuade, acknowledge
,
suggest, expect
,
assume, and suppose among others. In looking
over the list, it seems that Egre is right that such verbs are non-veridical. An ascription of
one of these attitudes can be true even if the complement of the attitude ascription is
false— that is, even if the that-clause denotes a false proposition. Further, each of the
relations denoted by these verbs is a relation that holds between a subject and a
proposition. Nevertheless, an attitude ascription of the form “jc Vs that /?” is true if and
only if a Vs that p is true. In other words, when x believes that p,x believes that p is true.
When jc claims that p, x claims that p is true. When jc persuades y that p, x persuades y
that p is true. So although the ascription itself may be true ifp is false, when jc Vs that p,x
Vs that p is true.
And this is true of all attitude ascriptions that take //////-complements when they
take //////-complements. In the case of those verbs that take both that- and whether-
complements, including know, remember
,
forget, decide, discover, guess, and others, one
also Vs that p is true, whenever one Vs that p. But in the case of these verbs, the attitude
ascription, “jc Vs that pf is true if and only if p is true. So why is it that these verbs that
are veridical can also take interrogative complements? Notice that when one Vs wh-p,
one Vs what the answer to ?p is. So when one knows wh-p, one knows what the answer
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to ?p is, when one forgets wh-p one forgets what the answer to ?p is. When one wonders
wh-p one wonders what the answer to ?p is. So this seems to provide evidence that verbs
that take interrogative complements express that one stands in the King relation to the
question and to stand in the King relation to the question is to V what the answer to the
question is.
If we are willing to adopt this understanding of questions and of imbedded
interrogatives, we must make a decision about whether Ving whether p always involves
King the true answer to the question. If we want to accept Egre’s claim that all and only
veridical verbs admit both r/ic/r-complements and vv/i^r/icr-complements, and if this is the
behavior we are concerned to explain, then it seems we should accept that Ving whether p
entails Ving the true answer to the question “?p”
.
One noticeable feature of this view is that a proponent of it can accept both of
Egre’s principles, or at least she can accept that they hold true of the veridical attitude
verbs. Consider first, his meaning ofwhether principle. Suppose we were to accept Egre’s
claim that whether- clauses after verbs like ask
,
investigate and wonder function
differently than whether-c\misQS after verbs like know. Then we can accept, with respect
to this restricted class of verbs, that “jc V whether p" is true in i iff the referent of x is in
the relation denoted by “V” to the true answer to the question, “?p” in i. For on the
current view, an attitude ascription of this form expresses that x is in the relation denoted
by “V” to the question denoted by “whether /?.” But on the proposed view, this just means
that the referent of “jc” is in the relation denoted by “V” to the true answer to the
question, “?p”. So “Tim forgets whether it is raining” express that Tim stands in the
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forgetting relation to the question, “Is it raining?”, and Tim stands in the forgetting
relation to this question if and only if Tim forgets what the true answer to the question is.
The difference is that on the proposed theory, “whether/?” does not denote the
true answer to the question “?p”. Instead “whether p" denotes the question, “?p”. Yet, we
might hold that to stand in any of the relations denoted by these attitude verbs to the
question, “?p” is to stand in that relation to the true answer to the question. So the current
proposal can accept that the meaning of whether principle holds for the same cases in
which it holds for the rival understanding of whether-clauses.
Another interesting feature of this view is that a proponent of it can also accept
Egre’s that-to-whether constraint. And if we accept, as Egre does, that all and only
veridical verbs can take both declarative and interrogative complements, then this view
can also explain why the that-to-whether constraint holds of these verbs. For some verb
that takes //?«r-complements will take w7i-complements only if it satisfies or would satisfy
the entailment from x Vs that p to x Vs whether p. And “whether /?,” on this view, denotes
the question expressed by “?p” which on this view just is the set of possible answers to
the question. And jc Vs whether p is true just in case jc stands in the Ving relation to the
question— that is, if x Vs what the answer to the question. In the case of a veridical verb,
p is the answer to the question, so jc will V the answer to the question if and only if a Vs
that p. Consider an example. If Ann knows that it is raining, then it is raining. So it is
raining is the answer to the question expressed by “Is it raining?” Thus if Ann knows that
it is raining, then Ann must know what the answer to the question, expressed by “Is it
raining?” is; and hence Ann knows whether it is raining. But, on the other hand, in the
case of non-veridical verbs the proposition p that is the object of the attitude need not be
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true. Thus it need not answer the question “?p”. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that
the subject Vs what the answer to the question, “?p” is; so Ving that p would not
guarantee Ving whether p. Consider believe for example. If Ann believes that it is
raining, it may or may not be actually raining. Suppose it is not. Then the answer to the
question, expressed by, “Is it raining?” and denoted by “whether it is raining” is it is not
raining. So Ann does not believe the answer to the question expressed by, “Is it raining?”
and hence Ann would not believe whether it is raining. Similarly, Ann may fear that it is
raining, even though it is not and hence would not fear the answer to the question
expressed by, “is it raining?”, and so would not fear whether it is raining. So we can see
that we do not need to accept Egre’s theory about embedded questions in order to accept
the principles he endorses. So if one is attracted to Egre’s principles, on should still be
willing to consider the current proposal as a rival to Egre’s.
On the other hand, if we want our view to accommodate the rare non-veridical
verb that takes vv/z-complements, then it seems that we should not build this component
into the theory. For in such a case, one may V whether p if one Vs what the answer to the
question is— but Ving what the answer to the question is, does not always involve Ving
the true answer to the question. So it is not clear to me that we should accept Egre’s
principles. Notice also that if the that-to-whether constraint is explanatory at all, it can
only explain the embedding behavior of verbs that take r/zaf-complements— it can explain
why such verbs do or do not also admit whether- complements. But the that-to-whether
constraint offers no explanation of the verbs that take only interrogative complements.
Egre seems to assume that the embedding-behavior of these verbs will involve a different
explanation. Further, Egre (2008, 1 16) is forced to offer an independent explanation of
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attitude ascriptions of non-veridical verbs that can, with the help of a preposition,
accommodate interrogative clauses. Egre (2008, 116) mentions agree. Agree seems to be
non-veridical— Peter and Paul can agree that p even if p is false. But agree on seems to
take whether-complements. That is, (25) seems to be permissible even if Peter and Paul
are both mistaken about whether it's raining.
(25) Peter and Paul agree on whether it is raining.
According to Egre, (25) should be understood as asserting the following:
(25p) There is some proposition p , such that p is about whether it is raining, and
Peter and Paul agree on p.
Egre (2008, 1 19) claims that some proposition is about a question if it is a potential
answer or at least a partial potential answer to the question. But such an interpretation of
(25) seems to involve a significant revision of Egre’s view— in particular it seems to
involve another shift in meaning of whether-clauses. For whether-clauses on his view are
supposed to be proposition-denoting. But if whether-clauses simply denote their true
answer, then Egre's claim about what it is for some proposition to be about a question
seems arbitrary. That is, it is not clear why some proposition is about whether it is raining
if it is a potential answer to the question, “Is it raining?” if “whether it is raining" denotes
the true answer to the question “Is it raining?” To see this, suppose it is not raining. Then
“whether it is raining” denotes the proposition that it is not raining. But suppose Peter and
Paul believe that it is raining. They agree about whether it is raining. But it seems strange
that in agreeing that it is not raining, they could be agreeing about whether it is raining if
“whether it is raining” denotes that it is raining.
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But note that the proposed account allows us to treat these sentences with non-
veridical verbs that admit interrogative complements with the help of a preposition in the
same way it treats other attitude ascriptions with interrogative complements. To agree
about whether-/?, on this view, is to agree about what the answer to the question “?p” is
(and certainly Peter and Paul may agree about what the answer to the question is and be
wrong about it). Similarly, to have a belief about whether p is to have a belief about what
the answer to the question “?p” is. To make a claim about whether p is to make a claim
about what the answer to the question is.
Conclusion
On the current proposal, an embedded interrogative will denote a question— a set
of possibilities each of which is the possible answer to the question. An attitude
ascription of the form, “jc Vs wh-p” expresses that jc stands in the Ving relation to the
question, “?p.” And to stand in the Ving relation to the question “?p” is to V what the
answer to the question is. If we are convinced by Egre’s arguments that all and only
veridical verbs can take both declarative and interrogative complements and we are
attracted to the alleged explanatory power of the that-to-whether principle, then we can
adapt the current proposal to fit the data. On this view, to stand in the Ving relation to the
question “?p” is to stand in the Ving relation to the true answer to p. On the other hand, if
we are not convinced that only veridical verbs can take interrogative complements and
we want to offer a uniform treatment of all attitude verbs with interrogative complements,
we will drop this understanding of what it is to V what the answer to the question is. We
may think that what it is to stand in the V relation to the question differs depending on
what relation is denoted by the verb. So knowing-ve/? will involve knowing what the
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answer to the question is, forgetting-w/i will involve forgetting what the answer to the
question is, and wondering-w// will involve wondering what the answer to the question is.
Of course, when one knows or forgets what the answer to the question is, one always
knows or forgets the true answer to the question. But when one wonders, one does not
stand in any relation to the answer to the question. The primary advantage of this
approach is that it allows a uniform treatment of all of the attitude verbs that take wh-
complements— including those like ask
,
wonder, and investigate which take only wh-
complements, and including those like believe
,
be surprised by, hope, and fear that can
take u’/z-complements only with the help of a preposition. So having beliefs about wh-p
also involves standing in the having beliefs about relation to a question— and to stand in
the having beliefs about relation to a question is to have beliefs about what the answer to
the question is. Note of course, that to have beliefs about wh-p does not require that our
beliefs about the question are true. Thus having beliefs about is a non-veridical predicate.
So it seems as though this understanding of questions can avoid the problems
faced by Egre's account and can still capture the data that Egre's view does, if we think
the “data” is worth capturing. That is, if we accept that a verb takes both declarative and
interrogative complements if and only if it is veridical then this view can explain why.
We can hold that atUtude-whether ascriptions assert that the subject stands in the relation
denoted by the attitude verb, V, to the question denoted by the embedded question. And
to stand in such a relation to a question is to stand in that relation to the true answer to the
question. On the other hand, if we reject Egre's hypothesis that all and only veridical
verbs take both kinds of complements, then we can explain this data as well. We will still
hold that attitude-whether ascriptions assert that the subject stands in the relation denoted
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by the attitude verb to the question denoted by the embedded question. But on this
version of the view, to stand in such a relation to a question is to V what the answer to the
question is. And what it is to V what the answer to the question is, will depend on which
relation is denoted by “V.” In the case of the veridical verbs, to V what the answer to the
question is to stand in the V relation to the true answer to the question; but in the case of
non-veridical verbs this is not the case.
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CHAPTER 5
ON KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION
It seems that knowledge and action are related in an important way. In their paper,
“Knowledge and Action,” John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (2008) argue that
knowledge is the norm of action. That is, they defend the Reason-Knowledge Principle:
that it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for action if and only if you
know that p.
29
They suggest that their proposal is a rather radical one in that most
accounts of the relation between knowledge and action seem to imply that some
subjective degree of belief in p is what is required for appropriately acting on p. In this
chapter I will first present and explain Hawthorne and Stanley’s principle. Next I will
argue that they mischaracterize the view that they consider to be the main rival to their
own and I suggest that the two views are compatible. Third I consider some objections to
Hawthorne and Stanley’s proposal put forward by Jessica Brown (2008) and Clayton
Littlejohn (forthcoming), and I argue that none of these objections is successful. I claim
that the contrastivist, in particular, has several moves available in the face of the alleged
problems with the Reason-Knowledge principle.
Hawthorne and Stanley on the Reason-Knowledge Principle
Hawthorne and Stanley’s main argument for their position relies on our ordinary
folk appraisals of one another’s behavior. They consider, for example, a case in which
Hannah and a companion are searching for a restaurant (2008, 57 1 ). When they come to a
This principle only applies when the subject's choice is p-dependent. The subject's
choice is p-dependent if and only if the most preferable option conditional on the
propostion that p is not the most preferable option conditional on the proposition that not-
P-
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fork in the road, Hannah decides on a hunch to lead her companion to the left. Hawthorne
and Stanley suggest that in this case we would criticize Hannah for her action. In
particular, they suggest our criticism would likely be something along these lines: “You
shouldn’t have gone down this street since you didn’t know the restaurant was here.”
They go on to point to many similar cases (2008, 571-4). For example, we would criticize
John for canceling his health insurance on the grounds that he does not know that he will
not get sick. Further, we would criticize a lottery entrant for selling his ticket on the
grounds that he does not know that the ticket will lose. We would criticize a prison guard
who shoots a potential escapee if the prison guard was acting on a hunch— and we would
make such a judgment even if the person shot was trying to escape. It seems, in this case,
that we will think that the prison guard was wrong for acting on the reason she did— that
is we will criticize the guard for acting without knowing that the person was trying to
escape.
Further, Hawthorne and Stanley (2008, 572-3) point out that blame and judgments
of negligence seem to interact with knowledge. So for example, we will blame a parent
for allowing a child to play near a dog if the parent does not know the dog will not bite.
Similarly we will think a doctor is negligent if she uses a needle she does not know is
safe. On the other hand, we tend to judge that a person acts appropriately when he
disregards a belief that he knows is not a piece of knowledge. For example, when the
germaphobe ignores his nagging belief that his hands are dirty he seems to be reasoning
appropriately— that is, in failing to act on his mere belief that his hands are dirty, the
germaphobe seems to be following the proper norm of action in refusing to act on a
proposition that he does not know. Hawthorne and Stanley claim that our intuitions in
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these cases provide strong support for their Reason-Knowledge principle. They claim that
the principle is the simplest explanation of the appraisals and judgments we make in
cases like those mentioned above— in each case we judge that someone reasons
inappropriately when they reason on the basis of some premise that is not known.
Reconsidering the Opponent
It is worthwhile to note at the outset, that it is not clear to me that Hawthorne and
Stanley’s view is really opposed to the view that they call the ’standard picture’. The
authors (2008, 57 1 ) suggest that on the standard picture there is no relation between
knowledge and action, because “rational action is a matter of maximizing expected
utility, where expected utility is a function of utility and subjective credence.” So
Hawthorne and Stanley suggest that on this picture, knowledge of p is sometimes
insufficient for appropriately using p as a premise in practical reasoning, and that on this
picture, knowledge that p is sometimes unnecessary for appropriately using p as a
premise in practical reasoning. But it seems to me that the standard picture is actually
silent on the appropriate use of p in practical reasoning. And in fact, it is likely that many
proponents of such a view would endorse a view like Hawthorne and Stanley’s.
To see this, consider some of the cases that Hawthorne and Stanley mention.
Consider first the case of Hannah and her companion searching for a restaurant. Suppose
they are facing a fork in the road, unsure which way to go. Suppose Hannah has a hunch
that the restaurant is on the left. That is, suppose her subjective credence that the
restaurant is on the left is .6 and her subjective credence that the restaurant is on the right
is .4. Suppose also that the value of going left, given that the restaurant is on the left,
times the value of going left, given that the restaurant is on the right, is equal to the value
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of going right, given that the restaurant is on the right, times the value of going right,
given that the restaurant is on the left. In this case the expected value of going left is
greater than the expected value of going right, so the standard view entails that the
rational thing to do would be for Hannah to go left. Hawthorne and Stanley note that
Hannah should not treat the proposition that the restaurant is on the left, as a reason for
going left. But the proponent of the standard view is likely to agree— if we asked
Hannah, “Why did you go left?” and she answered, “Because the restaurant was on the
left” then the proponent of the standard view would likely agree with Hawthorne and
Stanley that Hannah did not reason appropriately. But of course the proponent of the
standard view would likely not accept that Hannah should treat the proposition that the
restaurant is on the left as a reason for going left. Instead the proponent of the standard
view will likely hold that the proposition that going left seems to maximize expected
value (or some proposition roughly equivalent) is appropriate for Hannah to appeal to in
this situation. And indeed, it seems that Hawthorne and Stanley would agree with the
verdict of the standard view in this case.
So Hawthorne and Stanley (2008, 57 1 ) claim that the standard view gets things
wrong in allowing an agent to act on proposition p if and only if the agent has sufficiently
high subjective credence in p. But I suspect that no proponent of the standard view would
accept such a claim. Having sufficiently high subjective credence in p does not warrant
acting on p, but rather having sufficiently high subjective credence in p (combined with
p’s having sufficiently high value) warrants acting on the proposition that one has
sufficiently high subjective credence in p (or, more accurately warrants acting on the
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proposition that p seems to maximize expected value). So Hawthorne and Stanley's
interpretation of the standard view seems off the mark.
In addition, many of Hawthorne and Stanley’s intuitions about the appropriate
appraisals of a subject's reasoning are suspect. However, it is difficult to argue for this
claim because in many of the cases discussed we lack information necessary to come to
any clear-cut intuitions. If Hannah turns left on a hunch that ultimately proves wrong,
should she be criticized for reasoning in the way she did? And if she does deserve
criticism, is it on the grounds that she acted on some proposition that she did not know?
Suppose while standing at the fork, Hannah had a hunch that the restaurant was on the
left, but she was not confident in the hunch. Still, she had no other evidence that the
restaurant is to the left or to the right. Suppose also that there is no one around to ask. So
Hannah chooses to go left. Suppose, upon learning that the restaurant was not in fact
down that road, Sarah says, “You shouldn’t have gone down this street, since you didn't
know that the restaurant was here.” In these circumstances Sarah’s criticism seems
unwarranted. After all, Hannah had to choose one road or the other, and her credence that
the restaurant was to the left was slightly higher than her credence that it was to the right.
Given this data, going to the left was the appropriate thing to do, and it seems that
Hannah’s reasoning was perfectly rational. Indeed we should note that Hannah also did
not know that the restaurant was to the right; so if going down the road without knowing
that the restaurant was there is a criticizable offence, then whichever way Hannah went,
her reasoning could have been criticized. But this seems wrong. Surely she had to choose
one road, and given that she did not know which one was correct, she should have chosen
the road that the believed was most likely. So, in this case, Sarah’s criticism of Hannah is
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an unfounded one and not one that we should demand our theory of rationality to
countenance.
Consider another case— that in which a doctor uses a needle that she does not
know is clean. Should she be considered negligent as Hawthorne and Stanley suggest?
And if so, is it because she acted on some proposition that she does not know (namely the
proposition that the needle was clean)? Well again, it seems that we do not have enough
details of the case to form a clear intuition. If the doctor is unsure whether the available
needles are clean but suspects that a patient is in desperate need of an injection, what
should the doctor do? And how should the doctor reason towards this conclusion? It
seems reasonable that the doctor should do whatever maximizes expected utility. And so
the doctor should think about which of her alternatives would maximize expected utility
and do that one. If the doctor is criticized for using the needle, this is likely because the
criticizer believes that the doctor miscalculated expected utility and thinks that the risk of
using the (possibly dirty) needle outweighed the risk of the purported infection. If the
observer says to the doctor, “You were negligent because you did not know that the
needle was clean,” it seems that this criticism may be rejected by the doctor, who might
respond, “You’re right I didn’t know the needle was clean, but it seemed to me that the
risk was worth it.” So again, it seems that this is not a case in which the doctor reasons on
the basis of an unknown proposition— in this case, that the needle was clean— but rather
reasons on the basis of a proposition about expected value. And reasoning in this way is
perfectly appropriate.
Ill
Is Knowledge Necessary for Action?
Of course arguing for or against a theory on the basis of controversial intuitions is
notoriously difficult— especially when we are intuiting what “ordinary folk” would say in
a given imaginary circumstance. Perhaps it may be more fruitful to consider some cases
in which some proposition that is not known seems appropriate to use in practical
reasoning. Several philosophers (Brown 2008, Littlejohn forthcoming) have argued that
we should reject Hawthorne and Stanley’s Knowledge-Action principle because
knowledge seems unnecessary for using a proposition as a premise in practical reasoning.
In particular they argue that there are cases in which we can appropriately rely on (mere)
justified true belief in practical reasoning. Consider some Gettier-style situation. Brown
(2008, 171-2) mentions a case in which someone is supposed to meet a friend for lunch at
one o’clock. Suppose Mary checks the train schedule online and sees that it indicates that
there is a train leaving at 12:20, that will get her to her destination by 1 :00. Mary reasons
that she needs to be at the restaurant at 1 :00, and that there is a train leaving at 12:20 that
will get there by 1 :00 and so decides to take the 12:20 train. And indeed, there is a train
leaving at 12:20, which Mary takes, and Mary gets to lunch on time.
But unbeknownst to Mary, a hacker had, that morning, hacked onto the train’s
website and fiddled with the arrival and departure times so that most of the arrival and
departure times indicated on the online schedule were wrong. Fortunately the times listed
for Mary’s train happened to match-up with their real times. But presumably, if we accept
the Gettier-like intuitions, because of the hacker's trick, Mary’s belief that the train
leaves at 12:20 falls short of knowledge and qualifies as mere justified true belief. But
Brown claims that it was nevertheless appropriate for Mary to treat the proposition that
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the train leaves at 12:20 as a reason for acting. And of course, if Brown is right that Mary
does not know the proposition but can appropriately treat it as a reason, then we have a
counterexample to Hawthorne and Stanley’s principle.
Brown (2008, 173) suggests, rightly I think, that Hawthorne and Stanley will
attempt to explain away her intuition about the case. They will claim that Mary’s reliance
on the unknown proposition is, in fact, inappropriate, as their view implies, but they note
that her treating it as a reason is excusable. They caution the reader that we should not be
misled by excusable violations of the norm into thinking that the norm needs to be
modified. Instead, we should recognize that in cases like Mary’s, the norm of reasoning is
still violated, but the agent should be excused for doing so because she did not know that
her belief failed to be knowledge.
I admit that in cases like this my intuitions become unclear— it is difficult to
adjudicate between a case in which no norm is violated and a case in which a norm is
violated, albeit excusably. Perhaps this is one reason Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming)
avoids discussing such cases and attempts to raise other problems for Hawthorne and
Stanley’s account.
Littlejohn on the Reason-Knowledge Principle
Littlejohn (forthcoming, 2) argues that Hawthorne and Stanley’s claims about the
case like the doctor with the needle, seem to commit them to the following principle:
Fault 1: In cases where you ought not <E> unless p is true, you can be
blamed for d>-ing if you do not first know that p is true.
So, for example, if the doctor ought not use the needle unless it is clean, then she can be
blamed for using the needle if she does not know that it is clean.
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The problem, according to Littlejohn, is that Fault 1 seems to have unacceptable
consequences when combined with other intuitive principles. In particular, Littlejohn
(forthcoming, 2) claims that Fault2 is fairly uncontroversial:
Fault2: If you can be properly blamed for believing p, you are not justified
in believing p.
But Fault 1 and Fault2 together seem to cause problems. For they (along with some other
seemingly uncontroversial assumptions) entail that if your belief that p is practically
relevant, then your belief cannot be justified unless it is known. To see this, consider the
doctor again: she ought not use the needle unless it is clean, and so (by Fault 1 ) can be
blamed for using it if she does not know it is clean. But certainly, she can be
blameworthy for using the needle only if she is blameworthy for believing that it is
clean— for we surely cannot be blamed for acting on some belief unless we can be
blamed for having that belief. But if she can be blamed for believing that the needle is
clean, then (by Fault2) she cannot be justified in believing that the needle is clean. Or so
Littlejohn argues.
But it seems that each step of the argument is open to attack. Let us first consider
Fault 1 . Although Hawthorne and Stanley (2008, 586) mention several cases in which
someone is blameworthy for allegedly acting on some proposition that is not known, their
appeal to excusable violations of the norm indicate that they would not accept Fault I as a
general principle. That is, they will accept that in most cases in which someone acts on
some unknown premise, that agent is blameworthy. This lends support to their view. But
they acknowledge that there will be some cases in which a person acts on some unknown
premise in which the agent is not blameworthy— although they still will have violated a
norm, according to Hawthorne and Stanley, their violation is excusable— and hence they
do not deserve blame for it. Presumably the cases in which the norm is violated in an
“excusable” way will be just those cases in which the agent’s belief was justified— or
when the agent acted on a premise that she thought was known. So Hawthorne and
Stanley will reject Fault 1
.
Fault2 also seems suspicious. For it seems that the notion of justification and
blame can come apart when we are discussing belief in some proposition p. To deny
Fault2, is to claim that there are cases in which a person can be blamed for believing p
even though his belief in p is justified. And indeed, it appears that there are cases like
this. For it seems that being justified in believing p requires satisfying different criteria
than that required for being blameless in believing p. Being justified in believing p seems
to be a matter of what evidence you actually have. But being blameless with respect to
believing p seems to be a matter of what evidence you should have. Consider the doctor,
for example. Suppose that she walks into the office and she sees several needles on the
shelf where the clean needles are usually kept— suppose the doctor has been working at
the clinic for several years and each day the needles on that shelf have been clean. Given
this data, it seems that the doctor is justified in believing that the needles are clean— for
her current evidence indicates that it is highly likely that the needles are clean. But
suppose there is a chart kept in the clinic on which the previous doctor records the
location of the clean and dirty needles. If the doctor were to check the chart, as she is
supposed to, she would have seen that the needles on that shelf are not in fact clean. So in
this case the doctor’s belief that the needle is clean is justified but she is nevertheless
blameworthy for having that belief. So it appears that Fault2 is false— you can be blamed
1 15
for believing p even if you are justified in believing p. You are justified in believing p if
your actual evidence indicates that p is likely. But you are blameless in believing p only
if you have gathered all of the evidence you should have.
Finally, we may also want to reject the linking premise that Littlejohn suggests is
obviously true. Namely, the claim that the doctor cannot be blamed for using the needle
that is unclean unless she is blameworthy in holding the belief that it is clean. It seems
Littlejohn must accept the following principle: if you are blameless for believing p, then
you are blameless for acting on p. But this is precisely the principle Hawthorne and
Stanley want to deny— that is they want to argue that believing p (even blamelessly
believing p) is not enough to warrant acting on p. And that is what the doctor case is
supposed to show. Even if the doctor is justified in believing p, and even if the doctor is
blameless in believing p, it is still inappropriate for the doctor to act on p if she does not
know that p. And in many cases even if the agent acts on a belief that is justified and
blameless, he may still be blamed for performing the action—and in particular for
treating p as a reason for performing the action.
Littlejohn (forthcoming, 4) anticipates the proposed reply to Fault 1 , noting that
Hawthorne and Stanley may reject Fault I on the grounds that a person is not always
blameworthy for reasoning in ways that he ought not. But Littlejohn claims that this view
too, will encounter difficulties— in particular, it will lead a contradiction. He considers a
case that Hawthorne and Stanley mention in which an agent seems to do the right thing
but for the wrong reason. Imagine a prison guard who is told to shoot a prisoner if and
only if the prisoner is trying to escape. If the guard shoots a prisoner on a baseless hunch
that the he was trying to escape the guard will be faulted— even if the prisoner really was
trying to escape. Littlejohn (forthcoming, 4) notes that this seems correct. But he
(forthcoming, 5) revises the case a bit and claims that the theory delivers a contradiction.
Suppose George is a prisoner trying to escape. Suppose that the guard sees George trying
to escape and forms the true belief that George is a prisoner trying to escape.
Unbeknownst to the guard there are also actors, who look indistinguishable from the
prisoners, on the prison grounds filming an escape scene. Because of this, Littlejohn
claims that the guard does not know that George is a prisoner trying to escape— but
merely has a justified true belief to the effect that he is. Hence, according to Hawthorne
and Stanley it would be inappropriate for him to act on this belief. But the problem,
according to Littlejohn, is that this is the only premise that the guard could possibly act
on— for it is the only premise that could justify the guard’s action. So it seems that
Hawthorne and Stanley’s view entails that the guard ought not shoot George. But
according to the guard’s order, the guard ought to shoot George. So Hawthorne and
Stanley’s view entails that the guard ought to shoot George and ought not to shoot
George.
This seems to be a complicated argument that needs some unpacking. I take it that
Littlejohn's argument can be stated as follows:
1 . The guard does not know that George is a prisoner trying to escape.
2. If ( 1 ) then it would be inappropriate for the guard to shoot on the basis of the
premise that George is a prisoner trying to escape.
3. If it would be inappropriate for the guard to shoot on the basis of the premise
that George is a prisoner trying to escape, then the guard ought not shoot
George.
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4. Therefore, the guard ought not shoot George.
5. But the guard was given the following order: If a prisoner is trying to escape,
shoot the prisoner.
6. If (5), and if George is a prisoner trying to escape, then the guard ought to
shoot George.
7. George is a prisoner trying to escape.
8. Therefore, the guard ought to shoot George.
9. Therefore, the guard ought to shoot George and ought not to shoot George.
Of course, line 6 is problematic in that it assumes that if someone is given an order, then
they ought to follow it. But of course, this cannot be true of all orders. Sometimes we are
given a bad order and we ought not follow it. But this is easily fixed by simply assuming
that the order is a good one, and George ought to be shot if he tries to escape (assume
whatever details that your preferred moral theory requires you to assume— that shooting
George maximizes utility, or that it is the virtuous thing to do, or that it involves the
guard acting on a maxim that she can rationally will is universalizable, etc.) Given this
slight modification, lines 5 through 8 are unassailable. So if we are to avoid the
contradiction, we must reject one of the first three line. Line 1 looks rather plausible—
and it seems that anyone who accepts the Gettier-like intuitions will accept line 1 . And
line 2 follows straightforwardly from the Reason-Knowledge principle. So it appears that
line 3 is the only line available for Hawthorne and Stanley to reject.
But it seems clear that Hawthorne and Stanley will reject line 3. They (2008, 58 1
)
are careful to point out that their reason-knowledge principle is a constraint only on
appropriate reasoning— the obligation generated by the principle is a rational obligation.
Their principle tells us nothing about appropriate action— or what we should do. So if
premises 1 and 2 are true, it follows only that the guard violates some norm of rationality
in acting on the premise that George is a prisoner trying to escape— and so it follows that
the guard rationally ought not act on such a premise. But it does not follow from 1 and 2
that the guard all-things-considered ought not shoot the prisoner. If lines 5, 6, and 7 are
true, then the guard, all-things-considered ought to shoot the prisoner, despite the fact
that, in doing so on the basis of an unknown premise, he violates a norm of rational
action. In other words, there is no contradiction generated in this case because the
'ought's in lines 4 and 8 reflect different kinds of obligation. Line 4 should read,
“Therefore, the guard rationally ought not shoot George.” But Line 8 should read,
“Therefore, the guard all-things-considered ought to shoot George.” The conclusion,
then, should read, “Therefore the guard rationally ought not shoot George but all-things-
considered ought to shoot George.” But, of course, this conclusion is not a contradiction.
Littlejohn (forthcoming, fn. 10) remarks in a footnote that Hawthorne and Stanley
may avoid the contradiction by claiming that their principle generates only a prima facie
obligation. Hence they may accept that the guard has a prima facie obligation to refrain
from shooting George even though she ought to shoot George. Littlejohn claims that such
a move would be ad hoc, because the “the justification for acting on belief not known to
be true would have to be epistemic.” But this does not seem right if we allow that there
are more than one kind of obligation. On this possibility, Hawthorne and Stanley’s
principle entails that the guard rationally ought not shoot on the basis of the proposition
that George is a prisoner trying to escape; yet it still may be the case that the guard, all-
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things-considered ought to shoot on the basis of the proposition that George is a prisoner
trying to escape. So the overriding ought need not be an epistemic one.
Is Knowledge Sufficient for Action?
So it seems that Littlejohn’s arguments against the knowledge norm of action are
unsuccessful. And to my mind, examples involving justified true belief are inconclusive.
But in addition to arguing that knowledge is sometimes unnecessary for treating a
proposition as a reason. Brown (2008, 174-82) has also offered an argument that knowing
some proposition is sometimes not even sufficient for appropriately treating that
proposition as a reason for action. She (2008, 176) mentions a case in which a subject,
Liz, is offered a bet in which she must state where she was born. If she is correct, she gets
a penny and if she is incorrect, she loses her home. In such a case it seems irrational to
accept the bet despite the fact that the subject obviously knows the relevant proposition in
question. That is, it seems inappropriate for Liz to treat the proposition that she was born
in England as a reason for accepting the high-stakes bet.
Additionally, Brown (2008, 176) mentions a case in which a surgeon double-
checks the patient’s records even though he already knows that he is to remove the
patient’s left kidney. Brown claims that it would be inappropriate for the surgeon to treat
the proposition that the left kidney needs to be replaced as a reason for action even
though the doctor knows the proposition. She claims that in this case certainty seems
required for appropriately treating a proposition as a reason for acting.
Brown notes (2008, 179) that Hawthorne and Stanley will likely respond to the
alleged counterexamples by holding that the subjects do not in fact know the relevant
proposition in question and hence claim that their view gets the cases right. Both
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Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005) endorse Subject-Sensitive Invariantism— the view
that whether a subject, S, knows some proposition, p, depends not only on the subject’s
evidence and belief-forming processes but also on the stakes of the case— on how
important it is for S that p be true. Hence Hawthorne and Stanley will claim that in cases
like these, in which the subject faces such high stakes, the subject does not, in fact, know
the relevant proposition. Brown (2008, 179) argues that there is a dialectical problem
with Hawthorne and Stanley’s response. In particular, she claims that Hawthorne and
Stanley appeal to the Reason-Knowledge principle to support Subject-Sensitive
Invariantism and hence should not appeal to Subject-Sensitive Invariantism to defend the
Reason-Knowledge principle. This dialectical point aside, I find the proposed response to
the case unsatisfying because knowledge does not seem to depend on the stakes of the
case in the way that Hawthorne and Stanley suggest. Nevertheless, it seems that there are
responses open to those who reject Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. In particular it seems
that the contrastivist can make several moves in the face of Brown’s alleged
counterexamples.
Contrastivism and the Reason-Knowledge Principle
The contrastivist who wants to accept Hawthorne and Stanley's Reason-
Knowledge principle has several general options available for avoiding the alleged
problem raised by Brown. Either he can deny that the subject in the examples knows the
target proposition or he may accept that the proposition is known and attempt to explain
away the alleged intuition that it is inappropriate for the agent to act on the proposition. I
think that either option is a viable one for the contrastivist. Let us consider the first
possibility first.
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Notice that Brown’s argument against the claim that knowledge of p is sufficient
for appropriately treating p as a reason depends on the idea that one can know that p
without being certain that p. For each of the cases to which Brown points are cases in
which the subject allegedly knows that p but is not certain that p. So it seems that if
knowledge that p required certainty that p, then Brown’s objection to the sufficiently
claim would no longer apply. Additionally, it is open to the contrastivist to hold that
certainty is required for knowledge. Indeed Jonathan Schaffer (2005) has argued that it is.
On Schaffer’s view (2005, 255), S knows that p rather than q just in case p is true, S has
proof that p rather than q is true, and S is certain that p rather than q is true on the basis of
this proof. Such a theory allows us to avoid the seemingly problematic implications of
Brown’s theory because each of her cases seems to involve a subject who is uncertain
about the relevant proposition. On Schaffer’s view, it follows from this that the subject
does not know the relevant proposition, and therefore, by the Reason-Knowledge
principle, ought not treat the relevant proposition as a reason for acting. So if we endorse
a view like this, we can agree with Brown that the doctor ought to double-check the
charts so that he can be absolutely sure that it is the left kidney that needs replacing.
Further, we can agree with Brown that Liz should not take the bet if her confidence in her
place of birth is shaken by the high standards of the bet. Or, more accurately, we can
agree with Brown that Liz should not take the bet on the basis of the proposition that she
was born in England.
It is worth noting, that such a move by the contrastivist allows us to deliver
intuitive results in cases like these, but also seem to provide us with an intuitive picture of
what goes on in the other high-stakes cases often taken to support Subject-Sensitive
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Invariantism. As Stanley (2005) and Hawthorne (2004) have argued, there seem to be
instances in which the stakes of a case do impact our judgments about whether or not a
subject knows some proposition. To illustrate, imagine that Sam and Jill are driving past
the bank on Friday afternoon and they can see that the line is long.30 Sam would prefer to
deposit his check before Monday, but he has no pressing financial obligations that require
a deposit before Monday. Sam says to Jill, “I remember that the bank was open last
Saturday when I deposited my last paycheck, so it will be open this Saturday.” And, Sam
is right about this— the bank will be open on Saturday. Now, with respect to this case, we
may wonder, does Sam know that the bank will be open on Saturday? It seems to many
that Sam does know. But consider a scenario that is identical in every respect except that
the stakes of the case are raised. In this slightly revised scenario, Sam’s entire financial
future depends on his depositing the paycheck by Saturday. This time, when Sam says to
Jill, “I remember that the bank was open last Saturday when I deposited my last
paycheck, so it will be open this Saturday.” Jill points out that banks do change their
hours. Sam replies, “I guess you're right, I don’t know that the bank will be open
tomorrow.” We may wonder with respect to this case, does Sam know that the bank will
be open on Saturday? It seems to many that in this case, Sam does not know that the bank
will be open on Saturday. But how can we explain the difference in the two cases?
Stanley suggests that since it is only the stakes that have changed from the first case to
the second, the difference in stakes must be impacting our willingness to attribute
knowledge to Sam. Stanley takes this as evidence for the claim that the subject's interest
in a proposition can play a role in whether the subject knows that proposition.
30
This case is adapted from one discussed in Stanley (2005).
123
Schaffer (2006) has pointed out that the stakes are not all that have changed in the
two cases. In the second scenario but not the first, the possibility of error is raised by
Sam’s companion. Schaffer (2006, 90) suggests that this feature of case two is what
makes us reluctant to attribute knowledge to Sam. Schaffer (2006, 101 ) seems to hint
that Jill’s raising the possibility of error impacts the truth of our knowledge ascription to
Sam because it makes salient a different contrast proposition— and that in attributing
knowledge to Sam in the first case we are attributing to him the ability to answer one
question, but in attributing knowledge to Sam in the second case we would be attributing
to him the ability to answer a different, presumably a much more difficult, question.
While I think that this diagnosis of the case is one that a contrastivist might make,
there seems to be a more natural response available to a contrastivist who adopts a
certainty condition on knowledge. For it is then open to the contrastivist to explain why
Jill' s raising the possibility of error seems to make Sam’s knowledge vanish— it seems
that in mentioning the possibility of error, Jill causes Sam to doubt what he was once sure
of. Consequently, Sam becomes uncertain that the bank will be open on Saturday and,
according to the proposed view, Sam then fails to know the proposition.
Such a diagnosis can help us to explain other data as well. As Schaffer notes, in
cases in which the possibility of error is not raised, it seems that we are willing to ascribe
knowledge, whatever the stakes. So for example, he claims that if we were to retell the
'high-stakes’ story and leave out the conversation at the end in which Jill raises the
possibility of error, then our intuitions about the scenario change. In response to the
revised story, we are more likely to attribute knowledge to Sam even though the stakes
are really high. This seems to be evidence for the claim that it is the possibility of error
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and the consequential lack of certainty, rather than the high stakes, that are driving our
intuition that Sam does not know in the original case.
Further, as Brown (2008, 176) mentions, we are reluctant to ascribe knowledge in
scenarios in which the possibility of error is very salient even when they do not involve
really high stakes. Consider, for example, the case in which Liz is betting her house on
the truth of the proposition that she was bom in England. Hawthorne and Stanley will
claim that Liz does not know the proposition that she was bom in England in this
scenario and that this can be explained by the fact that Liz has a lot at stake in this
scenario. But their explanation seems to run into trouble when we consider that we may
have similar intuitions when the bet involves very low stakes. So suppose Liz is offered a
bet in which she is will receive a penny for correctly identifying her place of birth but in
which she will lose three dollars if she is incorrect. Many think that Liz ought not take the
bet. If Hawthorne and Stanley agree, and accept that Liz cannot treat the premise that she
was bom in England as a reason for taking the bet, then Hawthorne and Stanley will have
to accept that Liz does not know that she was born in England. But note that their
previous explanation seems unavailable to them in this case. For the stakes of the bet are
low. So the raised stakes cannot explain Liz’s failure to know in this scenario.
On the other hand, the proposed contrastivist response can explain our intuitions
in both of these cases. The contrastivist may hold that in both of the betting scenarios the
mere mention of the losing scenario and the apparent possibility of being wrong become
so apparent that it shakes the subject’s confidence and hence makes it the case that she is
no longer certain of something that she once was. But if she is no longer certain of
something she once was, then she know longer knows what she once knew. Thus it seems
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reasonable that in both the high and low stakes bet the apparent possibility of being
wrong makes it the case that Liz is no longer certain that she was bom in England. But if
she is not certain then she does not know that she was born in England and hence,
according to the Reason-Knowledge principle, it would now be inappropriate for Liz to
use this proposition as a reason for taking the bet.
So it seems that it is indeed possible for the contrastivist to hold that the subject in
each of Brown’s cases does not know the relevant proposition and hence none of the
cases is a counterexample to the Reason-Knowledge principle. It is open to the
contrastivist to explain the failure to know by appealing to the shift in the contrast
proposition. And it is open to contrastivist to explain the failure to know by appealing to
the lack of certainty of the subject in the face of high stakes or simply salient apparent
possibility of error. But suppose the contrastivist is unhappy with both of these possible
replies because he holds that the agent in each of the cases does, in fact, know the
relevant proposition. If such a person also wanted to uphold the Reason-Knowledge
principle, then he must explain why it is, contra Brown, appropriate for the agent to treat
the known proposition as a reason for action.
One possibility would be to uphold the claim that it is rationally appropriate to act
on p, but to maintain that there are other reasons against performing the relevant action.
In other words, we may argue that there are other propositions that are known that also
must be treated as reasons for action and perhaps these other propositions give us reason
for acting differently than p does. So, for example, suppose the doctor in Brown’s
scenario has at least the following two alternatives available to him:
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Alternative A: perform the surgery on the left kidney without double-
checking the patient’s chart
Alternative B: double-check the patient’s chart and then perform the
surgery.
If the doctor knows that it is the left kidney that needs to be replaced, then he can treat
this proposition as a reason for performing A. Yet it seems that the doctor may have other
reasons for performing B. Consider this proposition: before a doctor performs an organ
removal, if time permits, he ought to double-check the organ to be removed. Suppose this
proposition is true and that the doctor knows it. Then he can use this proposition as a
reason for performing B. So it looks, in this case that it is appropriate for the doctor to
treat the proposition that the left kidney needs to be replaced as a reason for action, yet
there is a stronger reason for the doctor to perform some other action. And similarly in
the case of Liz. Suppose she knows that she was bom in England. Then she can
appropriately treat this proposition as a reason for taking the bet. Yet there may be other
propositions that she knows that offer even stronger reasons against taking the bet. So
even if we share the intuition that Liz knows that she was bom in England, and we share
the intuition that Liz ought not take the bet, we need not consider this case to be a
counterexample to the Reason-Knowledge principle.
Conclusion
The claim that knowledge that p is not necessary for appropriately treating p as a
reason for action is unconvincing. Further, Littlejohn's arguments that the Reason-
Knowledge principle entails a contradiction or somehow conflicts with other obviously
true principles are unsuccessful. Finally, Brown’s claim that knowledge is sometimes
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insufficient for treating a proposition as a reason for action leaves room for doubt. Thus it
seems to me that one may endorse the Reason-Knowledge principle as defended by
Hawthorne and Stanly. Indeed the principle strikes me as reasonable and as one that we
generally uphold and appeal to in ordinary life. But to my mind, Hawthorne and Stanley
have overstated the novelty of their view and they have mischaracterized the view that
they take to be a rival to their own. Additionally, the “rival” view, when properly
understood, seems not only compatible with Hawthorne and Stanley's principle, but also
seems able to spell out the details of their proposal in an intuitive way.
Consider the “standard view” that Hawthorne and Stanley mention and what it
would say about some of the cases that the authors discuss. We have already mentioned
some of the implications such a view would have in the case of Hannah searching for a
restaurant. On the standard view, if there is no one around to ask for directions and
Hannah is slightly more confident that the restaurant is to the left, then going left is the
rational thing to do. This implication seems like the intuitive one. Now the standard view
is strictly speaking silent about which propositions Hannah rationally ought to rely on in
choosing to go left. But, contra Hawthorne and Stanley it seems very unlikely that a
proponent of this theory would suggest that Hannah should treat the proposition that the
restaurant is to the left as a reason for her action. Rather it seems much more reasonable
to allow that Hannah treat the proposition that she is slightly more confident that the
restaurant is to the left than to the right as a reason for action. Further, it seems that
Hawthorne and Stanley's view will deliver the same verdict.
It is open to the proponent of the standard view to offer a similar analysis of the
case of the doctor who is trying to decide whether to use a particular needle. Given
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Hawthorne and Stanley’s intuition that the doctor deserves blame for using the needle
without knowing that it is clean, it seems that they are assuming that the risk of using a
questionable needle outweighs the risk of using no needle at all. But the standard account
certainly has the tools to deliver the same verdict. If the expected value of using the
needle is lower than the expected value of failing to use the needle (as Hawthorne and
Stanley suggest), then the standard account will imply that the rational thing for the
doctor to do would be to avoid using the needle. On the basis of which premises should
the doctor make this decision? Pace Hawthorne and Stanley, it seems that the doctor
should not act on the proposition that the needle is not clean— because the doctor does
not know this proposition. Rather it seems that she should act on something like the fact
that she does not know whether the needle is clean and it is too risky to use a
questionable needle. This is information that the doctor knows. So according to the
Reason-Knowledge principle, it is certainly appropriate for the doctor to reason in this
way.
So it seems reasonable that we ought to act only on what we know. But the
propositions that we know are very often propositions about how likely things are— or at
least how likely things seem to us to be. But these are just the kinds of propositions that a
proponent of the standard view will likely suggest that we act on. So contra Hawthorne
and Stanley the standard view does not entail that having knowledge that p is independent
of whether it is rational to act on one’s belief that p. In fact the standard view does not
have any straightforward implications about when it is appropriate to act on p. What the
standard view says is that some act is rational for S just in case, in performing that act S
maximizes expected utility. Indeed expected utility is partly a function of the agents
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subjective credences, but a subject’s having a sufficiently high subjective credence in p
does not warrant acting on the proposition that p; rather it warrants acting on the
proposition that the subject has a sufficiently high subjective credence in p (together with
information about the utility of performing that particular action). And this view seems
remarkably similar to one that Hawthorne and Stanley endorse.
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